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In a seminal paper, Chris Erceg, Dale Henderson, and Andy Levin (2000)
analyzed the consequences for optimal monetary policy of the stickiness of
both wages and prices. A key contribution of their paper was the demon-
stration that the expected utility of the representative household in their
model could be approximated by an objective with three terms, involving
measures of the variability of wage inflation, price inflation and the output
gap respectively. While wage-inflation stabilization has not commonly been
included among the assumed objectives of monetary policy in studies that
lack welfare-theoretic foundations, Erceg et al. showed that in the context
of their model (with Calvo-style staggering of both wage- and price-setting
decisions), such an objective is appropriate in the case that wages as well as
prices are sticky. This is because variability of the rate of growth of nominal
wages implies misalignment of wages that are adjusted at different times, and
hence inefficient utilization of different types of labor. They showed further-
more that the existence of this additional stabilization objective implies that
a policy aimed solely at inflation stabilization (a strict inflation target) is not
generally optimal, and may be quite undesirable. Instead, their numerical
analysis suggests that one can do quite well by targeting an appropriately
chosen weighted average of wage and price inflation, with a greater relative
weight on wage inflation the greater the relative stickiness of wages.
Here we reexamine the issues raised by Erceg et al. in a slightly more
general setting. Following Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), Erceg et al. as-
sume the existence of an output subsidy in order to eliminate the distortion
resulting from the market power of the suppliers of differentiated goods, and
a similar employment subsidy to eliminate the distortion resulting from the
market power of the suppliers of differentiated forms of labor.1 As a result,
the equilibrium allocation of resources would be optimal in their model, in
the case that both wages and prices were fully flexible. This is an impor-
1In fact, as we show below, there is no need for two distinct subsidies to achieve the
result that they seek. The presence of a linear term in the quadratic approximation to
utility depends only on the overall index Φ of the degree of inefficiency of steady-state
output, introduced below.
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tant simplification, for it implies, even in the model with sticky wages and
prices, that the steady state level of output under a policy that maintains
stable prices is efficient, and hence that (to first order) an increase in the
average level of output would neither raise nor lower welfare. Hence in a
quadratic approximation to expected utility, obtained as a Taylor series ex-
pansion around the allocation associated with this steady state, there is no
linear term in the expected level of output. This allows Erceg et al. to obtain
a purely quadratic loss function, just as Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) do
in the case that only prices are sticky. Hence they obtain a welfare measure
that can be evaluated, to second order in the amplitude of the exogenous
disturbances, using only an approximate solution for the equilibrium result-
ing from a given policy rule that is accurate to first order, i.e., a log-linear
approximation to the model structural relations.
While this feature of their results makes the analysis much more tractable
in the case that they consider, the assumption of output and employment
subsidies (rather than positive tax rates on sales, payrolls, and wage income)
is clearly unrealistic. Furthermore, there is reason to fear that such an analy-
sis may miss an important aspect of the welfare consequences of stabilization
policy. As Henderson and Kim (2003), among others, have stressed, in exact
models of optimal wage- and price-setting one typically finds that stabiliza-
tion policy affects the average levels of equilibrium output and employment,
and not simply their variability. In the welfare analysis of Erceg et al., such
effects may be neglected, because a change in the average level of output that
is only of second order in the amplitude of the disturbances has no second-
order effect on welfare; but this result depends on the fact that (owing to the
assumed subsidies) the steady-state level of output is optimal. Under more
realistic assumptions, the steady-state level of output would be judged to be
inefficiently low, owing to tax distortions as well as market power in both the
goods and labor markets; but this would mean that a second-order effect of
stabilization policy on average output would make a second-order contribu-
tion to welfare, that might be as important (even in the case of arbitrarily
small disturbances) as the second-order welfare effects of stabilization policy
considered by Erceg et al.
Here we show how the analysis of Erceg et al. can be extended to take ac-
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count of such effects, and hence to allow a correct welfare analysis (to second-
order accuracy) even in the presence of substantial steady-state distortions.
One approach to dealing with such effects that has recently become popular
involves solving for equilibrium under alternative policy rules to second-order
accuracy, using a second-order Taylor series expansion of the model struc-
tural relations. Here we show instead that, even in the case of a distorted
steady state, it is possible to obtain a purely quadratic loss function, similar
to the one obtained by Erceg et al., which can then be evaluated to second-
order accuracy using only log-linear approximations to both the policy rule
and the model structural relations. This requires that we substitute out the
linear terms in the Taylor series expansion for expected utility in terms of
purely quadratic terms, using the method employed by Benigno and Wood-
ford (2004) in the case of an economy with staggered price-setting but flexible
wages. (Essentially, the effects of stabilization policy on the average level of
output are used to replace a welfare measure that involves the average level
of output by one that is purely quadratic.) In this way, we are able to show
that results similar to those of Erceg et al. continue to obtain in the case of a
distorted steady state, though the size of the steady-state distortions matters
for one’s quantitative conclusions regarding the nature of optimal policy.
We generalize the analysis of Erceg et al. other respects as well. Erceg et
al. consider only policies with the property that in the absence of exogenous
disturbances, the equilibrium will correspond to the efficient steady state.
(This means policies under which both wages and prices will be constant,
in the absence of exogenous disturbances.) This allows them to obtain an
approximate welfare measure that involves only the variances of macroeco-
nomic variables. We drop this assumption, and so obtain an approximate
welfare measure that also allows one to compare policies under which the
average inflation rate is not exactly zero. It turns out that in the kind of
model considered here, optimal policy does involve a zero average inflation
rate; but this result can be derived from our evaluation of alternative rules
using the quadratic loss function, rather than having to be assumed from the
start.2 Finally, Erceg et al. restrict attention to time-invariant policy rules,
2The conclusion is not an obvious one, in the case that the steady state with zero
inflation is no longer assumed to involve an efficient level of output, since the model is one
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and evaluate unconditional expected utility in the stationary equilibrium as-
sociated with such a rule. We show instead how it is possible to evaluate
discounted expected utility conditional upon some initial state, though we
propose a criterion for optimality (“optimality from a timeless perspective”)
under which optimal policy can be shown (rather than being assumed) to be
time-invariant.
1 Monetary Stabilization Policy: Welfare-Theoretic
Foundations
Here we describe our assumptions about the economic environment and pose
the optimization problem that a monetary stabilization policy is intended to
solve. The approximation method that we use to characterize the solution
to this problem is then presented in the following section. Further details
of the derivation of the structural equations of our model of nominal price
and wage rigidities can be found in Erceg et al. (2000) and Woodford (2003,
chapter 3).
1.1 Objective and Constraints
In our model, there is a continuum of measure one of households. Household
of type j seeks to maximize
U jt0 ≡ Et0
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0
[
u˜(Cjt ; ξt)− v(ht(j); ξt)
]
, (1.1)
where Ct is a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregate of consumption of each of a continuum
of differentiated goods,
Ct ≡
[∫ 1
0
ct(i)
θp−1
θp di
] θp
θp−1
, (1.2)
with an elasticity of substitution equal to θp > 1, and ht(j) is the quantity
supplied of labor which is specific to household of type j.
in which the average inflation rate affects the average level of output.
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There is a continuum of measure one of differentiated goods and each
household consumes all the goods. The objective of policy is to maximize
the sum of the utilities of the households at time t0. We will assume risk-
sharing among the households in a way that they will face the same budget
constraint and make the same consumption choices even if they have different
wages. It follows that the objective of policy is to maximize Ut0 defined as
Ut0 ≡ Et0
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0
[
u˜(Ct; ξt)−
∫ 1
0
v(ht(j); ξt)dj
]
. (1.3)
To simplify the algebraic form of our results we shall restrict attention to the
case of isoelastic functional forms,
u˜(Ct; ξt) ≡ C
1−σ˜−1
t C¯
σ˜−1
t
1− σ˜−1 , (1.4)
v(ht; ξt) ≡ λ
1 + ν
h1+νt H¯
−ν
t , (1.5)
where σ˜, ν > 0, and {C¯t, H¯t} are bounded exogenous disturbance processes.
(We use the notation ξt to refer to the complete vector of exogenous distur-
bances, including C¯t and H¯t.) We assume that the labor used to produce
each good is a CES aggregate of the continuum of individual types of labor
supplied by the households defined by
Ht(i) ≡
[∫ 1
0
ht(j)
θw−1
θw dj
] θw
θw−1
for some elasticity of substitution θw > 1. Here ht(j) is the labor of type j
that is hired. Each differentiated type of labor is supplied in a monopolistically-
competitive market. It follows that the demand for labor of type j on the
part of wage-taking firms is given by
ht(j) = Ht
(
wt(j)
Wt
)−θw
, (1.6)
where wt(j) is the nominal wage demanded for labor of type j and Wt is the
Dixit-Stiglitz wage index
Wt ≡
[∫ 1
0
wt(j)
1−θwdj
] 1
1−θw
, (1.7)
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and Ht is defined as
Ht ≡
∫ 1
0
Ht(i)di.
We assume a common technology for the production of all goods
yt(i) = Atf(Ht(i)) = AtHt(i)
1/φ,
where At is an exogenously varying technology factor, and φ > 1. We first
note that we can write∫ 1
0
v(ht(j); ξt)dj =
λ
1 + ν
H1+νt ∆w,tH¯
−ν
t , (1.8)
where
∆w,t =
∫ 1
0
(
wt(j)
Wt
)−θw(1+ν)
dj ≥ 1 (1.9)
is a measure of wage dispersion at date t. Moreover
Ht =
∫ 1
0
Ht(i)di = Y
φ
t A
−φ
t ∆p,t, (1.10)
where
∆p,t ≡
∫ 1
0
(
pt(i)
Pt
)−θp(1+ωp)
di ≥ 1 (1.11)
is a measure of price dispersion at date t, in which Pt is the Dixit-Stiglitz
price index
Pt ≡
[∫ 1
0
pt(i)
1−θpdi
] 1
1−θp
, (1.12)
and ωp ≡ φ− 1 Using (1.8), (1.10) and the identity
Yt = Ct +Gt
to substitute for Ct, where Gt is exogenous government demand for the com-
posite good, we can write the utility flow in the form U(Yt,∆p,t,∆w,t; ξt),
where the vector ξt now includes the exogenous disturbances Gt and At as
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well as the preference shocks.3 Hence we can write our objective (1.3) as
Ut0 = Et0
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0U(Yt,∆p,t,∆w,t; ξt). (1.13)
We assume that the wage for each type of labor is set by the monopoly
supplier of that type, who stand ready to supply as many hours of work as
turn out to be demanded at that wage. We assume that wage setters fix
the wages in monetary units for a random interval of time, as in the model
of staggered pricing introduced by Calvo (1983). We let 0 ≤ αw < 1 be
the fraction of wages that remain unchanged in any period. A supplier that
changes its wages in period t chooses its new wage wt(j) to maximize
Et
{ ∞∑
T=t
(αwβ)
T−t[ΛTwt(j)hT (wt(j))− v(hT (wt(j)); ξt)
}
, (1.14)
where ΛT is the representative household’s marginal utility of nominal income
in period T and the dependence of labor demand hT (j) upon the wage is given
by (1.6), and αT−tw is the probability that a wage chosen in period t will not
have been revised by period T .
Each of the wage suppliers that revise their wages in period t choose the
same new wage w∗t , that maximizes (1.14). Note that supplier j’s objective
function is a concave function of the quantity of working hours supplied ht(j),
since revenues are proportional to h
θw−1
θw
t (j) and hence concave in ht(j), while
costs are convex in ht(j). Moreover, since ht(j) is proportional to wt(j)
−θw ,
the objective function is also concave in wt(j)
−θw . The first-order condition
for the optimal choice of the wage wt(j) is the same as the one with respect
to wt(j)
−θw ; hence the first-order condition with respect to wt(i),
Et
{ ∞∑
T=t
αw
T−tQt,THTW θwT
[
w∗t − µw
vh(hT (w
∗
t ); ξt)
u˜c(YT −GT ; ξT )PT
]}
= 0,
3The government is assumed to need to obtain an exogenously given quantity of the
Dixit-Stiglitz aggregate each period, and to obtain this in a cost-minimizing fashion. Hence
the government allocates its purchases across the suppliers of differentiated goods in the
same proportion as do households, and the index of aggregate demand Yt is the same
function of the individual quantities {yt(i)} as Ct is of the individual quantities consumed
{ct(i)}, defined in (1.2).
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where
µw ≡ θw
θw − 1 ,
is both necessary and sufficient for an optimum. In the above expression,
Qt,T is the stochastic discount factor by which financial markets discount
random nominal income in period T to determine the nominal value of a
claim to such income in period t. In equilibrium, this discount factor is given
by
Qt,T = β
T−t u˜c(CT ; ξT )
u˜c(Ct; ξt)
Pt
PT
.
Under our assumed isoelastic functional forms, the optimal choice has a
closed-form solution
w∗t
Wt
=
(
Kw,t
Fw,t
) 1
1+νθw
, (1.15)
where Kw,t and Fw,t are functions of current aggregate output Yt, the real
wage Wt/Pt, the index of price dispersion ∆p,t, the current exogenous state
ξt, and the expected future evolution of wage inflation, output, real wage,
price dispersion and disturbances, defined by
Fw,t ≡ Et
∞∑
T=t
(αwβ)
T−tuy(YT ; ξT )Y
φ
T A
−φ
T ∆p,T
WT
PT
(
WT
Wt
)θw−1
, (1.16)
Kw,t ≡ Et
∞∑
T=t
(αwβ)
T−tµwvh(Y
φ
T ; ξT )Y
φ
T A
−φ(1+ν)
T ∆
1+ν
p,T
(
WT
Wt
)θw(1+ν)
, (1.17)
where we have used the definition
u(Y ; ξ) ≡ u˜(Y −G; ξ).
The wage index then evolves according to a law of motion
Wt =
[
(1− αw)w∗1−θwt + αwW 1−θwt−1
] 1
1−θw , (1.18)
as a consequence of (1.7). Substitution of (1.15) into (1.18) implies that
equilibrium wage inflation in any period is given by
1− αwΠθw−1w,t
1− αw =
(
Fw,t
Kw,t
) θw−1
1+νθw
, (1.19)
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where Πw,t ≡ Wt/Wt−1. This defines a short-run aggregate supply relation be-
tween wage inflation and output, real wage and the index of price dispersion,
given the current disturbances ξt, and expectations regarding future wage
inflation, output, real wage, the index of price dispersion and disturbances.
We can also use (1.18) to derive a law of motion of the form
∆w,t = hw(∆w,t−1,Πw,t) (1.20)
for the dispersion measure defined in (1.9), where
hw(∆w,Πw) ≡ αw∆wΠθw(1+ν)w + (1− αw)
(
1− αwΠθw−1w
1− αw
)− θw(1+ν)
1−θw
.
The producers for each differentiated good fix the prices of their goods in
monetary units for a random interval of time. We let 0 ≤ αp < 1 be the
fraction of prices that remain unchanged in any period. A supplier that
changes its price in period t chooses its new price pt(i) to maximize
Et
{ ∞∑
T=t
αT−tp Qt,TΠ(pt(i), PT ;WT , YT , ξT )
}
where the function
Π(p(i), P ;W,Y, ξ) ≡ (1− τ)p(i)Y (p(i)/P )−θp −W · f−1(Y (p(i)/P )−θp/A)
(1.21)
indicates the after-tax nominal profits of a supplier with price p when the
aggregate price index is equal to P and aggregate demand is equal to Y . Here
τt is the proportional tax on sales revenues in period t; we treat {τt} as an
exogenous disturbance process, taken as given by the monetary policymaker.
We assume that τt fluctuates over a small interval around a non-zero steady-
state level τ¯ ; this is a further reason for inefficiency of the steady-state level
of output, in addition to the market power of the suppliers of differentiated
goods.4 The disturbances τt and At are also included as elements of the
vector of exogenous disturbances ξt.
4Other types of distorting taxes would have similar consequences, since it is the overall
size of the steady-state inefficiency wedge that is of greatest importance for our analysis,
as we show below. To economize on notation, we assume that the only distorting tax is
of this particular kind.
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Each of the suppliers that revise their prices in period t choose the same
new price p∗t , that maximizes (1.21). Note that supplier i’s profits are a
concave function of the quantity sold yt(i), since revenues are proportional to
y
θp−1
θp
t (i) and hence concave in yt(i), while costs are convex in yt(i). Moreover,
since yt(i) is proportional to pt(i)
−θp , the profit function is also concave in
pt(i)
−θp . The first-order condition for the optimal choice of the price pt(i) is
the same as the one with respect to pt(i)
−θp ; hence the first-order condition
with respect to pt(i),
Et
{ ∞∑
T=t
αT−tp Qt,TΠ1(pt(i), PT ;WT , YT ; ξT )
}
= 0,
is both necessary and sufficient for an optimum. The equilibrium choice p∗t
(which is the same for all the firms that adjust their prices at time t) is the
solution to the above equation.
Under our assumed isoelastic functional forms, the optimal choice has a
closed-form solution
p∗t
Pt
=
(
Kp,t
Fp,t
) 1
1+ωpθp
, (1.22)
where Fp,t and Kp,t are functions of current aggregate output Yt, the current
exogenous state ξt, and the expected future evolution of inflation, output,
real wages and disturbances, defined by
Fp,t ≡ Et
∞∑
T=t
(αpβ)
T−t(1− τT )uy(YT ; ξT )YT
(
PT
Pt
)θp−1
, (1.23)
Kp,t ≡ Et
∞∑
T=t
(αpβ)
T−tuy(YT ; ξT )φµp
WT
PT
(
YT
AT
)φ(
PT
Pt
)θp(1+ωp)
, (1.24)
in which expressions
µp ≡ θp
θp − 1 . (1.25)
The price index then evolves according to a law of motion
Pt =
[
(1− αp)p∗1−θpt + αpP 1−θpt−1
] 1
1−θp
, (1.26)
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as a consequence of (1.12). Substitution of (1.22) into (1.26) implies that
equilibrium inflation in any period is given by
1− αpΠθp−1p,t
1− αp =
(
Fp,t
Kp,t
) θp−1
1+ωpθp
, (1.27)
where Πp,t ≡ Pt/Pt−1. This defines a short-run aggregate supply relation
between inflation and both output and real wage, given the current distur-
bances ξt, and expectations regarding future inflation, output, real wage and
disturbances. We can also use (1.26) to derive a law of motion of the form
∆p,t = hp(∆p,t−1,Πp,t) (1.28)
for the dispersion measure defined in (1.11), where
h(∆p,Πp) ≡ αp∆pΠθp(1+ωp)p + (1− αp)
(
1− αpΠθp−1p
1− αp
)− θp(1+ωp)
1−θp
.
Equations (1.20) and (1.28) are the sources in our model of welfare losses
from price and wage inflation or deflation. Finally we note that price and
wage inflation rates are related to the real wages as
wR,t = wR,t−1
Πw,t
Πp,t
, (1.29)
where wR,t ≡ Wt/Pt.
We assume the existence of a lump-sum source of government revenue
(in addition to the proportional tax τ on sales revenues), and assume that
the fiscal authority ensures intertemporal government solvency regardless of
what monetary policy may be chosen by the monetary authority. This allows
us to abstract from the fiscal consequences of alternative monetary policies
in our consideration of optimal monetary stabilization policy, as in Erceg et
al. (2000) and much of the literature on monetary policy rules.
Finally, we follow Erceg et al. in abstracting from any monetary fric-
tions that would account for a demand for central-bank liabilities that earn a
substandard rate of return; we nonetheless assume that the central bank can
control the riskless short-term nominal interest rate it, as discussed in Wood-
ford (2003, chapter 2). We also assume that the zero lower bound on nominal
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interest rates never binds under the optimal policies considered below,5 so
that we need not introduce any additional constraint on the possible paths
of output and prices associated with a need for the chosen evolution of prices
to be consistent with a non-negative nominal interest rate. We also note that
the ability of the central bank to control it in each period gives it one de-
gree of freedom each period (in each possible state of the world) with which
to determine equilibrium outcomes. Considering (1.20), (1.28) and (1.29)
and because of the existence of the aggregate-supply relations (1.19), (1.27)
as necessary constraints on the joint evolution of price, wage inflation rates
and output, there is exactly one degree of freedom to be determined each
period, in order to determine particular stochastic processes {Πw,t, Πp,t, Yt}
from among the set of possible rational-expectations equilibria. Hence we
shall suppose that the monetary authority can choose from among the possi-
ble processes {Πw,t, Πp,t, Yt} that constitute rational-expectations equilibria,
and consider which equilibrium it is optimal to bring about; the detail that
policy is implemented through the control of a short-term nominal interest
rate will not actually matter to our calculations.
1.2 Optimal Policy from a “Timeless Perspective”
Under the standard (Ramsey) approach to the characterization of an optimal
policy commitment, one chooses among state-contingent paths {Πp,t,Πw,t, Yt,
wR,t, ∆p,t, ∆w,t, Fp,t, Kp,t, Fw,t, Kw,t} from some initial date t0 onward that
satisfy (1.16), (1.17), (1.19), (1.20), (1.23), (1.24), (1.27), (1.28) and (1.29)
for each t ≥ t0, given initial price and wage dispersions ∆p,t0−1, ∆w,t0−1 and
initial real wage wR,t0−1, so as to maximize (1.13). Such a t0−optimal plan
requires commitment, insofar as the corresponding t−optimal plan for some
later date t, given the initial conditions ∆p,t−1,∆w,t−1 and wR,t−1 obtaining at
that date, will not involve a continuation of the t0−optimal plan. This failure
of time consistency occurs because the constraints on what can be achieved at
date t0, consistent with the existence of a rational-expectations equilibrium,
5This can be shown to be true in the case of small enough disturbances, given that the
nominal interest rate is equal to r¯ = β−1 − 1 > 0 under the optimal policy in the absence
of disturbances.
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depend on the expected paths of the above set of variables at later dates;
but in the absence of a prior commitment, a planner would have no motive
at those later dates to choose a policy consistent with the anticipations that
it was desirable to create at date t0.
However, the degree of advance commitment that is necessary to bring
about an optimal equilibrium is of only a limited sort. Paralleling the analysis
of Benigno and Woodford (2004), it can be shown that the Ramsey problem
can be decomposed in two stages of which the second is fully recursive and
of the same form of the Ramsey problem itself except for an additional con-
straint on a particular set of variables. In our case this set Xt is given by
Xt ≡ (Fp,t, Kp,t, Fw,t, Kw,t).
Our aim here is to characterize policy that solves this constrained opti-
mization problem in which one chooses among state-contingent paths {xt,
Xt}, with xt ≡ {Πp,t, Πw,t, Yt, wR,t, ∆p,t,∆w,t} from some initial date t0 on-
ward that satisfy (1.16), (1.17), (1.19), (1.20), (1.23), (1.24), (1.27), (1.28)
and (1.29) for each t ≥ t0, given initial price and wage dispersions ∆p,t0−1,
∆w,t0−1, real wage wR,t0−1 and an initial condition on the set of variables Xt0 ,
so as to maximize (1.13). Because of the recursive form of this problem, it is
possible for a commitment to a time-invariant policy rule from date t onward
to implement an equilibrium that solves the problem, for some specification
of the initial commitments Xt. A time-invariant policy rule with this prop-
erty is said by Woodford (2003, chapter 7) to be “optimal from a timeless
perspective.”6 Such a rule is one that a policymaker that solves a traditional
Ramsey problem would be willing to commit to eventually follow, though
the solution to the Ramsey problem involves different behavior initially, as
there is no need to internalize the effects of prior anticipation of the policy
adopted for period t0. One might also argue that it is desirable to commit
to follow such a rule immediately, even though such a policy would not solve
the (unconstrained) Ramsey problem, as a way of demonstrating one’s will-
ingness to accept constraints that one wishes the public to believe that one
will accept in the future.
6See also Woodford (1999) and Giannoni and Woodford (2002).
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2 A Linear-Quadratic Approximate Problem
In fact, we shall here characterize the solution to this problem (and simi-
larly, derive optimal time-invariant policy rules) only for initial conditions
near certain steady-state values, allowing us to use local approximations in
characterizing optimal policy. We establish that these steady-state values
have the property that if one starts from initial conditions close enough to
the steady state, and exogenous disturbances thereafter are small enough, the
optimal policy subject to the initial commitments remains forever near the
steady state. Hence our local characterization describes the long run char-
acter of Ramsey policy, in the event that disturbances are small enough.7
Of greater interest here, it describes policy that is optimal from a timeless
perspective in the event of small disturbances.
We first must show the existence of a steady state, i.e., of an optimal
policy (under appropriate initial conditions) that involves constant values
of all variables. To this end we consider the purely deterministic case, in
which the exogenous disturbances C¯t,Gt,H¯t,At, τt each take constant values
C¯, H¯, A¯, τ¯ > 0, G¯ ≥ 0 for all t ≥ t0. We wish to find an initial degree of price
and wage dispersions ∆p,t0−1, ∆w,t0−1 and initial commitments Xt0 = X¯ such
that the solution to the optimal problem involves a constant policy xt = x¯,
Xt+1 = X¯ each period, in which ∆¯p and ∆¯w are equal to the initial price and
wage dispersions. We show in the appendix that the first-order conditions
for this problem admit a steady-state solution of this form, and we verify
below that (when our parameters satisfy certain bounds) the second-order
conditions for a local optimum are also satisfied.
We show that Π¯p = Π¯w = 1(zero price and wage inflation), and corre-
spondingly that ∆¯p = ∆¯w = 1(zero price and wage dispersion). We may
furthermore assume without loss of generality that the constant values of C¯
and H¯ are chosen so that in the optimal steady state, Ct = C¯ and Ht = H¯
7See Benigno and Woodford (2004) for further discussion. In the simpler model treated
there, it is shown explicitly that Ramsey policy converges asymptotically to the steady
state of the constrained problem, so that the solution to the LQ approximate problem
approximates the response to small shocks under the Ramsey policy, at dates long enough
after t0. A similar result could be established here using similar reasoning.
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each period.8
We next wish to characterize the optimal responses to small perturbations
of the initial conditions and small fluctuations in the disturbance processes
around the above values. To do this, we compute a linear-quadratic approx-
imate problem, the solution to which represents a linear approximation to
the solution to the policy problem defined above. An important advantage
of this approach is that it allows direct comparison of our results with those
obtained in other analyses of optimal monetary stabilization policy. Other
advantages are that it makes it straightforward to verify whether second-
order conditions hold that imply that a solution to our first-order conditions
will represent at least a local optimum, and that it provides us with a welfare
measure with which to rank alternative sub-optimal policies, in addition to
allowing computation of the optimal policy.
2.1 A Quadratic Approximate Welfare Measure
We begin by computing a Taylor-series approximation to our welfare measure
(1.13), expanding around the steady-state allocation defined above, in which
yt(i) = Y¯ and ht(j) = H¯ for each good and variety of labor at all times and
ξt = 0 at all times.
9 As a second-order (logarithmic) approximation to this
measure, we obtain10
Ut0 = Y¯ u¯c · Et0
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0ΦYˆt − 1
2
uyyYˆ
2
t + Yˆtuyξξt − u∆p∆ˆp,t − u∆w∆ˆw,t
+ t.i.p. +O(||ξ||3), (2.30)
where Yˆt ≡ log(Yt/Y¯ ), ∆ˆp,t ≡ log∆p,t and ∆ˆw,t ≡ log∆w,t measure deviations
of aggregate output, price and wage dispersion measured from their steady-
8Note that we may assign arbitrary positive values to C¯, H¯ without changing the nature
of the implied preferences, as long as the value of λ is appropriately adjusted.
9Here the elements of ξt are assumed to be c¯t ≡ log(C¯t/C¯), h¯t ≡ log(H¯t/H¯), at ≡
log(At/A¯), Gˆt ≡ (Gt − G¯)/Y¯ , and τˆt ≡ (τt − τ¯)/τ¯ , so that a value of zero for this vector
corresponds to the steady-state values of all disturbances. The perturbation Gˆt is not
defined to be logarithmic so that we do not have to assume positive steady-state value for
this variable.
10See the appendix for details. Our calculations here follow closely those of Woodford
(2003, chapter 6) and Benigno and Woodford (2004).
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state levels, the term “t.i.p.” collects terms that are independent of policy
(constants and functions of exogenous disturbances) and hence irrelevant for
ranking alternative policies, and ||ξ|| is a bound on the amplitude of our
perturbations of the steady state.11 Here the coefficient
Φ ≡ 1− θw − 1
θw
θp − 1
θp
(1− τ¯) < 1
measures the steady-state wedge between the marginal rate of substitution
between consumption and leisure and the marginal product of labor, and
hence the inefficiency of the steady-state output level Y¯ . The coefficients
uyy, uyξ, u∆p and u∆w are defined in the appendix.
In addition, we can take a second-order approximation to equations (1.20)
and (1.28) and integrate them to obtain
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0 ∆ˆw,t =
αw
(1− αw)(1− αwβ)θw(1+ν)(1+νθw)
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0
pi2w,t
2
+t.i.p.+O(||ξ||3),
(2.31)
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0 ∆ˆp,t =
αp
(1− αp)(1− αpβ)θp(1+ωp)(1+ωpθp)
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0
pi2p,t
2
+t.i.p.+O(||ξ||3),
(2.32)
where pip,t ≡ lnPt/Pt−1 and piw,t ≡ lnWt/Wt−1. Substituting (2.31) and
(2.32) into (2.30), we can then approximate our welfare measure by
Ut0 = Y¯ u¯c · Et0
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0 [ΦYˆt − 1
2
uyyYˆ
2
t + Yˆtuyξξt −
1
2
upippi
2
p,t −
1
2
upiwpi
2
w,t]
+t.i.p. +O(||ξ||3), (2.33)
for certain coefficients upiw , upip > 0 defined in the appendix. Note that we
can now write our stabilization objective purely in terms of the evolution of
the aggregate variables {Yˆt, piw,t, pip,t} and the exogenous disturbances.
11Specifically, we use the notation O(||ξ||k) as shorthand for
O(||ξ, ∆ˆ1/2p,t0−1, ∆ˆ
1/2
w,t0−1, Xˆt0 ||k), where in each case hats refer to log deviations from
the steady-state values of the various parameters of the policy problem. We treat ∆ˆ1/2p,t0 ,
∆ˆ1/2w,t0 as expansion parameters, rather than ∆ˆp,t0 , ∆ˆw,t0 because (1.20), (1.28) imply
that deviations of the inflation rates from zero of order  only result in deviations in the
dispersion measures ∆p,t, ∆w,t from one of order 2. We are thus entitled to treat the
fluctuations in ∆p,t, ∆w,t as being only of second order in our bound on the amplitude of
disturbances, since if this is true at some initial date it will remain true thereafter.
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We note that when Φ > 0, there is a non-zero linear term in (2.33), which
means that we cannot expect to evaluate this expression to second order using
only an approximate solution for the path of aggregate output that is accurate
only to first order. Thus we cannot determine optimal policy, even up to first
order, using this approximate objective together with approximations to the
structural equations that are accurate only to first order. Erceg et al. (2000)
avoid this problem by assuming an output subsidy (i.e., a value τ¯ < 0) of
the size needed to ensure that Φ = 0. Here we wish to relax this assumption.
We show here that an alternative way of dealing with this problem is to use
a second-order approximation to the aggregate-supply relations to eliminate
the linear terms in the quadratic welfare measure. We show in the appendix
that to second order, equations (1.19) and (1.27) can be written as
Vj,t = ξj(c
′
j,xxt + cj,ξξt +
1
2
x′tCj,xxxt − x′tCj,xξξt +
1
2
cj,pippi
2
p,t +
1
2
cj,piwpi
2
w,t) + βEtVj,t+1
+s.o.t.i.p.+O(||ξ||3), (2.34)
for j = p, w. Here the notation “s.o.t.i.p.” indicates terms independent of
policy that are entirely of second or higher order, xt denotes a two-by-one
vector whose elements are Yˆt and wˆR,t ≡ log(wR,t/w¯R). We have defined
Vj,t ≡ pij,t + 1
2
vj,pipi
2
j,t + vj,zpij,tZj,t,
where
Zj,t ≡ Et
∞∑
T=t
(αjβ)
T−t[zj,yYˆT + zj,rwˆR,T + zj,pipij,T + zj,ξξT ];
for certain coefficients defined in the appendix. Note that to first order,
Vj,t = pij,t, and (2.34) reduces simply to
pij,t = ξj(c
′
j,xxt + cj,ξξt) + βEtpij,t+1, (2.35)
for j = p, w, which represents two “New Keynesian Phillips curve” relations,
for prices and wages respectively, as in Erceg et al. (2000).
In the appendix, we sum the two equations in (2.34) and integrate the
resulting equation forward to obtain a relation of the form
Vt0 = Et0
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0 [Yˆt+
1
2
cyyYˆ
2
t −Yˆtcyξξt+
1
2
cpippi
2
p,t+
1
2
cpiwpi
2
w,t]+t.i.p.+O(||ξ||3).
(2.36)
17
We can then use (2.36) to write the discounted sum of output terms in (2.33)
as a function of purely quadratic terms, up to a residual of third order. As
shown in the appendix, we can rewrite (2.33) as
Ut0 = −ΩEt0
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0
{qy
2
(Yˆt − Yˆ ∗t )2 +
qp
2
pi2p,t +
qw
2
pi2w,t
}
+Tt0+t.i.p.+O(||ξ||3),
(2.37)
where 12
Ω ≡ Y¯ uc > 0,
qy ≡ ω + σ−1 + Φ(1− σ−1)− Φσ
−1(s−1C − 1)
ω + σ−1
, (2.38)
Yˆ ∗t = ω1Yˆ
n
t − ω2Gˆt + ω3τˆt, (2.39)
qp ≡ θp
ξp(ω + σ−1)
[(ω + σ−1) + Φ(1− σ−1)], (2.40)
qw ≡ θw
ξw(ω + σ−1)
[(ω + σ−1) + Φ(1− σ−1)], (2.41)
and
Yˆ nt =
σ−1gt + ωqt − ωτ τˆt
(ω + σ−1)
, (2.42)
in which expressions
ω1 = q
−1
y [(ω + σ
−1) + Φ(1− σ−1)],
ω2 =
Φs−1C σ
−1
(ω + σ−1)2 + Φ[(1− σ−1)(ω + σ−1)− (s−1C − 1)σ−1]
,
ω3 ≡ ωτ
(ω + σ−1) + Φ[(1− σ−1)− (s−1C − 1)σ−1(ω + σ−1)−1]
.
Here Yˆ nt and ωˆ
n
t represent log-linear approximations to the “natural rate
of output and real wage,” i.e., the flexible-price equilibrium levels of output
and real wages (Woodford, 2003, chap. 3). In terms of this notation, the
log-linear aggregate supply relations (2.35) can be written as
pip,t = κp[Yˆt − Yˆ nt ] + ξp[ωˆR,t − ωˆnt ] + βEtpip,t+1, (2.43)
12In what follows, the following definitions have been used: σ−1 ≡ σ˜−1s−1C with sC ≡
C¯/Y¯ ; ω ≡ φν + ωp; ωqt ≡ νh¯t + φ(1 + ν)at; gt ≡ Gˆt + sC c¯t; ωτ ≡ τ¯ /(1 − τ¯); ξp ≡
(1− αpβ)(1− αp)/[αp(1 + θpωp)]; ξw ≡ (1− αwβ)(1− αw)/[αw(1 + θwν)].
18
piw,t = κw[Yˆt − Yˆ nt ]− ξw[ωˆR,t − ωˆnt ] + βEtpiw,t+1, (2.44)
while
ωˆR,t = ωˆR,t−1 + piw,t − pip,t, (2.45)
where κp ≡ ξpωp and κw ≡ ξwνφ. The term Tt0 ≡ ΦY¯ u¯cVt0 is a transitory
component where Vt0 is defined in the appendix.
Once again, we are interested in characterizing optimal policy from a
timeless perspective. We observe from the form of the structural relations
(2.34) and the definition of Vj,t that the aspects of the expected future evo-
lution of the endogenous variables that affect the feasible set of values for
inflation rates, real wage and output in any period t can be summarized (in
our second-order approximation to the structural relations) by the expected
values of Vj,t+1, Zj,t+1 for j = p, w. Hence the only commitments regarding
future outcomes that can be of value in improving stabilization outcomes
in period t can be summarized by commitments at t regarding the state-
contingent values of those two variables in the following period. It follows
that we are interested in characterizing optimal policy from any date t0 on-
ward subject to the constraint that given values for Vj,t0 , Zj,t0 for j = p, w
be satisfied,13 in addition to the constraints represented by the structural
equations.
But given predetermined values for Vj,t0 the value of the transitory com-
ponent Tt0 is predetermined. Hence, over the set of admissible policies, higher
values of (2.37) correspond to lower values of
Et0
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0
{qy
2
(Yˆt − Yˆ ∗t )2 +
qp
2
pi2p,t +
qw
2
pi2w,t
}
. (2.46)
It follows that we may rank admissible policies in terms of the implied value
of the discounted quadratic loss function (2.46). Because this loss function
is purely quadratic (i.e., lacking linear terms), it is possible to evaluate it
to second order using only a first-order approximation to the equilibrium
evolution of inflation and output under a given policy. Hence the log-linear
13Note that a specification of initial values for these four variables corresponds, in our
quadratic approximation to the structural equations, to a specification of initial values for
the four variables Fp,t0 ,Kp,t0 , Fw,t0 ,Kw,t0 in section 1.
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approximate structural relations (2.43), (2.44) and (2.45) are sufficiently ac-
curate for our purposes.
Similarly, it suffices that we use log-linear approximations to the variables
Vj,t0 in describing the initial commitments, which are given by Vˆj,t0 = pij,t0 for
j = p, w. Then an optimal policy from a timeless perspective is a policy from
date t0 onward that minimizes the quadratic loss function (2.46) subject to
the constraints implied by the linear structural relation (2.43), (2.44) and
(2.45) holding in each period t ≥ t0 given the initial condition ωˆR,t0−1and
subject also to the constraints that a certain predetermined values for Vˆp,t0
and Vˆw,t0 be achieved.
14 This last constraint may equivalently be expressed
as a constraint on the initial inflation rates,
pip,t0 = p¯ip,t0 piw,t0 = p¯iw,t0 . (2.47)
2.2 Comparison with Erceg, Henderson and Levin
Thus we obtain a quadratic stabilization objective (2.46) similar to the one
derived in Erceg et al. (2000) under the assumption that Φ = 0, but now
allowing for an arbitrary degree of steady-state distortions. As in the analysis
of Erceg et al., the loss function is a sum of three terms, indicating the
distortions resulting from variations in the rate of price inflation, the rate of
wage inflation, and the output gap, respectively.
There are, however, some noteworthy differences between (2.46) and the
loss function of Erceg et al.. One is that the loss function of Erceg et al. is
expressed as a sum of variances of the three variables (price inflation, wage
inflation, and the output gap), whereas our loss function is linear in the ex-
pected values of these variables squared. Our loss function implies (assuming
that qy, qp, qw > 0, as discussed below) that an increase in the variance of any
of the variables, holding constant its mean level, will lower welfare; and in-
deed our loss function is linear in the variances, holding constant the expected
values of the variables. But we find that there are also losses associated with
an average rate of price or wage inflation different from zero (in either di-
14The constraint associated with a predetermined value for Zt0 can be neglected, in a
first-order characterization of optimal policy, because the variable Zt does not appear in
the first-order approximation to the aggregate-supply relation.
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rection), and similarly with an average output gap different from zero; these
effects are neglected by Erceg et al. by assumption.15
The loss function (2.46) also differs from the one derived by Erceg et al. in
that it involves expected losses in each of an infinite sequence of periods, with
the losses expected in future periods discounted at the rate βt. The form of
loss function derived by Erceg et al. is instead obtained, following Rotemberg
and Woodford (1997), by evaluating the unconditional expectation of the
utility of the representative household in the stationary equilibrium implied
by one stationary policy rule or another; since the unconditional expectation
of the period utility in such an equilibrium is the same each period, one need
only consider the unconditional expectation of the utility flow in a single
period. The alternative (discounted) welfare measure derived here is instead
appropriate if one wishes to characterize optimal policy in the sense described
above (what we have called “optimal policy from a timeless perspective”).
One advantage of defining the policy problem as we have here is that it allows
us to use standard methods for the solution of (discounted) linear-quadratic
stochastic control problems to characterize optimal policy.16
Apart from these differences in what our loss function measures (and
hence in the form in which we report our results), there are also differences
in our conclusions that result from the fact that we treat the more general case
in which Φ (our measure of the overall severity of steady-state distortions)
need not equal zero. First of all, a non-zero value of Φ affects the quantitative
magnitudes of the weights qy, qp, qw on the different stabilization objectives.
In the case that G¯ = 0 (there are no steady-state government purchases),
each of these weights is proportional to
(ω + σ−1) + Φ(1− σ−1).
It then follows that increasing Φ (for given values of the other model pa-
rameters) does not change the relative weights on alternative stabilization
15Erceg et al. restrict their attention to policies with the property that in the absence
of shocks, the equilibrium obtained will be the optimal steady state. This restriction is
innocuous as far as the characterization of optimal stabilization policy is concerned (since
the optimal policy belongs to the class considered); but the more general form of loss
function provides additional insight into the nature of optimal policy.
16For further discussion, see Woodford (2003, chap. 7).
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objectives, and hence the relative ranking of alternative equilibria. Even in
this case, however, the assumed value of Φ will affect one’s conclusion about
how much the improvement of stabilization policy matters for welfare; in the
case that we judge to be most realistic, in which σ > 1,17 a higher value of Φ
implies greater welfare gains from stabilization. For example, if we calibrate
the parameters ω and σ in accordance with the estimates of Rotemberg and
Woodford (1997),18 then an inefficiency wedge of a more realistic magnitude,
Φ = 1/3,19 would increase the expected losses from any given degree of ag-
gregate volatility by 45 percent, relative to what would be obtained under
the assumption that Φ = 0.
In a more realistic parameterization, of course, one should allow for the
existence of a positive average level of government purchases, G¯, so that
sC < 1. In this case, increasing Φ does not increase qy by as great a factor
as the increase in the weights qp and qw; hence the relative weight on the
output-stabilization objective should be somewhat lower in an economy with
a distorted steady state than would be appropriate if Φ = 0. It is not clear,
however, how important this qualification is likely to be in practice. Under
the calibration just considered, for example, if we assume that G¯ is equal to 20
percent of steady-state output, then increasing Φ from 0 to 1/3 will increase
qp and qw by nearly 45 percent, as just discussed, while it will increase qy
by a factor of only 41 percent. However, the value obtained for the relative
weight qy/(qp+ qw) under the assumption that Φ = 0 is exaggerated only by
slightly more than 2 percent.
Under more extreme assumptions about the share of government pur-
chases in total demand, the mis-estimation of the appropriate relative weight
on output stabilization could be much greater. In fact, the correct value of qy
indicated by (2.38) may actually be negative, whereas Erceg et al. conclude
that the relative weight on the output stabilization objective is positive (as
we also find, if Φ = 0). This failure of convexity of our welfare-theoretic loss
17Note that in this model, σ is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution for all private
expenditure, and not simply for non-durable consumer expenditure. See Woodford (2003,
chaps. 4, 5) for further discussion.
18These values are ω = .473 and σ−1 = .157.
19This would result, for example, if we assume an elasticity of demand θ = 10, a wage
markup of 8 percent, and an average tax rate τ¯ of 20 percent.
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function does not necessarily imply that the second-order conditions for a
local welfare maximum fail to hold, or that randomization of policy would
be welfare-improving, as discussed in Benigno and Woodford (2004). But
such a case would mean that the conclusions of Erceg et al. about the degree
to which one should be willing to accept greater variability of price and wage
inflation for the sake of output-gap stabilization would be quite inaccurate.
This will occur, however, only under fairly extreme assumptions. For exam-
ple, a sufficient condition for qy to be positive, regardless of the magnitude
of the steady-state distortions, is that
sG <
(1 + ω)(ω + σ−1)
(1 + ω)(ω + σ−1) + σ−1
. (2.48)
(Here sG ≡ G¯/Y¯ is the steady-state share of government purchases in total
demand.) For moderate values of Φ, the value of sG can be even larger;
but even the bound (2.48) is likely to hold. For example, in the case of the
Rotemberg-Woodford parameter values, this bound holds as long as govern-
ment purchases are no more than 85 percent of GDP.
Allowing for Φ > 0 also changes the definition of the target output level
Yˆ ∗t in the welfare-theoretic loss function (2.46). Contrary to what Erceg et
al. obtain, Yˆ ∗t no longer corresponds in general to the equilibrium level of
output under flexible wages and prices, Yˆ nt , as shown by (2.39). We observe
that when Φ = 0, ω1 = 1 and ω2 = 0, so that (2.39) implies that Yˆ
∗
t = Yˆ
n
t ,
in the absence of fluctuations in the tax rate (also not considered by Erceg
et al.). If, instead, Φ > 0, and in addition sG is positive (but less than the
upper bound (2.48)), then ω1 > 1. This means that fluctuations in tastes
or technology move Yˆ ∗t by more than their effect on Yˆ
n
t .
20 This has the
consequence that attempting to stabilize output around trend rather than
around the time-varying target level would be an even greater mistake than
is indicated by an analysis that assumes that Φ = 0.
Furthermore, when Φ > 0, and sG satisfies (2.48),
21 ω2 > 0 in (2.39).
20Under the parameter values considered above, for example, one would obtain ω1 =
1.02.
21In fact, it suffices for this conclusion (and for those of the previous paragraph) that
sG be small enough for qy to be positive.
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Indeed, one can show that
ω2 >
σ−1
ω + σ−1
(ω1 − 1),
from which it follows (also using (2.42)) that an increase in government
purchases increases Yˆ ∗t by less than the increase in Yˆ
n
t . This means that
it is not desirable to allow output to increase quite as much in response to
an increase in government purchases as would occur under flexible wages and
prices.22
The fact that the target level of output will move in a somewhat different
way than the flexible-wage-and-price equilibrium level of output (or natural
rate of output) has consequences for the degree to which stabilization of some
combination of wages and prices, without attention to the consequences of
policy for aggregate real activity, is likely to provide a good approximation
to optimal policy. As a result, some of the more suggestive results of Erceg
et al. may not be quite so accurate a guide to policy in the case of significant
steady-state distortions.
We have shown that the policy objective (2.46) can be expressed solely
as a function of the evolution of the inflation rates and the welfare-relevant
output gap
xt ≡ Yˆt − Yˆ ∗t .
It is useful to write the linear constraints implied by our model’s structural
equations in terms of the welfare-relevant output gap as well. The aggregate-
supply relations (2.43) and (2.44) can alternatively be expressed as
pip,t = κpxt + ξp[ωˆR,t − ωˆnt ] + βEtpip,t+1 + up,t, (2.49)
piw,t = κwxt − ξw[ωˆR,t − ωˆnt ] + βEtpiw,t+1 + uw,t (2.50)
where uj,t, for j = p, w are composite “cost-push” term. In terms of our
previous notation for the exogenous disturbances in the model, this is given
by
uj,t ≡ κj(Yˆ ∗t − Yˆ nt )
= κj(ω1 − 1)Yˆ nt − κjω2Gˆt + κjω3τˆt.
22For example, under the parameter values considered above, an increase in government
purchases equal to one percent of steady-state output would increase Yˆ nt by 0.25 percent,
while it would increase Yˆ ∗t by only 0.14 percent.
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The presence of these “cost-push” terms (not present in the aggregate-
supply relations of Erceg et al.) implies a tension between the goals of wage
and price stabilization, on the one hand, and output-gap stabilization (in
the welfare-relevant sense) on the other. In the case that Φ = 0, then ω1 =
1, ω2 = 0, and up,t = uw,t = 0, except if there are fluctuations in the tax
rate. If, instead, Φ > 0, then there are other reasons for the cost-push
terms to be non-zero. As we have just discussed, in the case of greatest
interest, fluctuations in preferences or technology that raise the natural rate
of output will result in positive cost-push terms in both (2.49) and (??), while
increases in government purchases will result in negative cost-push terms in
both equations.
This makes it even more difficult for all three stabilization goals to be
simultaneously achieved than is indicated by the analysis of Erceg et al. For
example, Erceg et al. conclude that if either wages or prices are completely
flexible (so that the welfare-theoretic weight on one of the stabilization objec-
tives is zero), then it should be possible to fully achieve both of the remaining
stabilization objectives by completely stabilizing wage inflation (if only wages
are sticky) or price inflation (if only prices are sticky). In the presence of
cost-push terms, this ceases to be the case. Even when prices are fully flex-
ible, the presence of the cost-push terms implies that complete stabilization
of wage inflation will not imply complete stabilization of the welfare-relevant
output gap, or vice versa.23
Erceg et al. find, on the basis of numerical analysis of a calibrated model,
that a simple policy rule that stabilizes an index of wages and prices provides
a close approximation to optimal policy, if the relative weight on wages as
opposed to prices in this index is appropriately chosen.24 However, this
result most likely depends on their having made assumptions under which
there are no cost-push terms. For example, it is easy to see why the result
is true, if there are no cost-push terms, in the case just discussed in which
only wages are sticky. (In that case, the appropriate index to target involves
nominal wages only.) But when cost-push terms are present, as is almost
23The corresponding result in the case of an economy in which only prices are sticky is
established by Benigno and Woodford (2004).
24See also Woodford (2003, chap. 6) for results in the same vein.
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inevitably the case if the steady state is distorted, optimal policy no longer
corresponds to stabilization of the nominal wage; instead, the nominal wage
should be a function of the history of the cost-push terms.25 On the other
hand, the optimal evolution of the real wage (and hence, of goods prices)
should depend on the evolution of the natural real wage ωnt as well. In
general, real disturbances will affect the natural real wage in a different way
than they affect the cost-push terms, and so one cannot expect there to be
any linear combination of wages and prices that will be constant in an optimal
equilibrium. Since in this case, the optimal simple rule is fully optimal when
there are no cost-push terms, but can be far from optimal when Φ is far
from zero, one suspects that the same is true when both wages and prices
are sticky.26
Erceg et al. also find that another class of simple policy rules, in which
a weighted average of price inflation and the output gap is stabilized, also
provides a good approximation to optimal policy when the weights are ap-
propriately chosen. But here again, it is likely that the result depends on the
absence of cost-push terms (in the case of substantial stickiness of wages).
Let us once more consider the simple case of perfectly flexible prices but
sticky wages. In this case, optimal policy requires complete stabilization of
the nominal wage when there are no cost-push shocks. Flexibility of prices
means that the pricing relation (2.49) reduces to
ωˆR,t − ωˆnt + ωpxt = 0,
if there is no cost-push term. At the same time, (2.50) implies that in the
optimal equilibrium, since wage inflation is always zero,
κwxt − ξw[ωˆR,t − ωˆnt ] = 0,
if there is no cost-push term. Together, these two relations imply that xt = 0
in the optimal equilibrium, which is a limiting case of the class of simple rules.
On the other hand, if Φ > 0, cost-push terms are present in both (2.49)
and (2.50). It is no longer optimal to fully stabilize wage inflation, exactly
25A method that can be used to characterize the way in which the wage should depend
on the history of disturbances is discussed in the next section.
26The same conclusion is supported by a consideration of the case of “equally sticky”
wages and prices in section xx below.
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because this will no longer imply complete stability of the output gap; in-
stead, the optimal evolution of both the nominal wage and the output gap
will be a function of the history of cost-push disturbances. At the same time,
the optimal evolution of the real wage (and hence, of goods prices), will de-
pend on the evolution of the natural real wage as well. Once again, there will
in general be no linear combination of price inflation and the output gap for
which these different sorts of dependence on the history of real disturbances
will happen to cancel. And since the family of simple rules ceases to include
an optimal rule even in this special case, it is likely that it ceases to include
any rule that is so close to being optimal as Erceg et al. report, in the case
that both wages and prices are sticky.
3 Optimal Stabilization Policy
We now use our linear-quadratic approximate policy problem to characterize
optimal policy in the event of small enough disturbances. We begin by noting
that the first-order conditions associated with an LQ problem of this kind
characterize an optimum only in the case that certain second-order conditions
are satisfied as well. However, it follows from our results in the previous
section that the weights qp, qw > 0. Hence the loss function (2.46) is convex
(and the second-order conditions are necessarily satisfied) as long as qy > 0 as
well.27 A sufficient condition for this, in turn, is that the share of government
purchases in total demand satisfy (2.48). As long as this bound is satisfied,
the solution to the first-order conditions will represent an optimum of the
LQ problem. This means that in the even of small enough disturbances, this
same solution will represent a linear approximation to a policy that represents
at least a local welfare optimum in the exact model.
3.1 The Case of “Equally Sticky” Wages and Prices
As stressed by Erceg et al. (2000), it is not in general possible to fully stabilize
all the target variables in the loss function (2.46). However, in the absence of
27This condition is sufficient but not necessary. See further discussion in Benigno and
Woodford (2004).
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cost-push shocks, optimal policy still corresponds to complete stabilization
of an appropriately defined index of wages and prices, in at least one special
case. Suppose that θwφ
−1 = θp and that κp = κw = κ. (We can think of this
special case as one in which wages and prices are “equally sticky”.) In this
case the loss function (2.46) can be written as
Et0
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0
{qy
2
xt
2 +
qpi
2
p¯i2t +
qp
2
(1− γ)(ωˆR,t − ωˆR,t−1)2
}
(3.51)
where p¯it ≡ γpip,t + (1 − γ)piw,t is a weighted average of the price and wage
inflation rates, with weight 0 < γ < 1 determined by γ ≡ ωp/(ω + σ−1), and
where qpi ≡ qp/γ. Under these conditions, by subtracting (2.50) from (2.49)
and using (2.45), we obtain a difference equation for the evolution of the
real wage, from which it follows that the real wage is independent of policy.
Moreover, by taking a weighted average of (2.50) and (2.49), we obtain
p¯it = κxt + βEtp¯it+1 + ut, (3.52)
where ut ≡ γup,t + (1− γ)uw,t.
In the case that Φ = 0 and there are no variations in the tax rate, as
assumed by Erceg et al., there are no cost-push terms, and ut = 0 at all times
in (3.52). It then follows that complete stabilization of p¯it implies complete
stabilization of xt as well. Since the real wage evolves independently of policy
in this case, it is then obvious that (3.51) attains its lowest possible value
under such a policy. Hence it is optimal to completely stabilize a weighted
average of price inflation and wage inflation.
However, even when wages and prices are “equally sticky,” this result
fails to obtain in the case of a distorted steady state.28 When Φ > 0, real
disturbances of any sort will generally result in a non-zero cost-push term
ut in (3.52), as discussed in the previous section. Complete stabilization of
p¯it continues to be possible, but in this case requires fluctuations in xt, and
it will be preferable to allow some degree of variation in p¯it for the sake of
greater stability of the output gap.
28It would also fail if there are variations in tax rates or in market power that would
give rise to cost-push terms even in the case that Φ = 0.
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Since real wages are independent of policy, to characterize the optimal
tradeoff one can simply consider the processes {xt, p¯it} that maximize (3.51)
under the constraint (3.52) for each t ≥ t0, given an initial commitment for
the value of p¯it0 . One observes that the form of this problem is the same —
and that the solution is therefore the same (in the case of a given {ut} process
and given values of qpi and qy) — as in the Φ = 0 case treated in Woodford
(2003, chap. 7).29 We recall here some of the main results presented there,
which directly apply to the present case as well.
The first-order conditions for the optimization problem just stated are of
the form
qpip¯it + ϕt − ϕt−1 = 0, (3.53)
qyxt − κϕt = 0, (3.54)
for each t ≥ t0, where ϕt is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the
constraint (3.52) in period t. Bounded processes {p¯it, xt, ϕt} that satisfy
(3.52) and (3.53) – (3.54) for each t ≥ t0 and are consistent with the initial
condition (2.47) represent an optimum. Using (3.53) to eliminate p¯it and
(3.54) to eliminate xt,
30 (3.52) becomes an equation for the evolution of the
multiplier
βqyEtϕt+1 − [(1 + β)qy + κ2qpi]ϕt + qyϕt−1 = qpiqyut. (3.55)
The initial condition (2.47) can similarly be expressed as a constraint on the
path of the multipliers
ϕt0 − ϕt0−1 = −qpip¯it0 . (3.56)
An optimum can then be described by a bounded process {ϕt} for all dates
t ≥ t0 − 1 that satisfies (3.55) for each t ≥ t0 and is also consistent with
(3.56).
Equation (3.55) has a unique bounded solution consistent with (3.56) if
and only if the characteristic equation
βµ2 −
[
1 + β +
κ2qpi
qy
]
µ+ 1 = 0 (3.57)
29See also Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999) for analysis of an LQ problem of this form.
30Here we assume that both qpi, qy 6= 0. Note that if either qpi or qy happens to equal
zero, optimal policy is easily characterized: it consists simply of the complete stabilization
of the variable with the non-zero weight in the loss function.
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has exactly one root such that |µ| < 1. This requires that the characteristic
equation have real roots, exactly one of which lies in the interval between -1
and 1; this in turn is true if and only if qpi 6= 0 and
qy
qpi
> − κ
2
2(1 + β)
. (3.58)
Note that (3.58) is necessarily satisfied if (2.48) holds, since in that case
qpi, qy > 0.
A characterization of the optimal equilibrium is then obtained by solving
(3.53) and (3.54) for p¯it and xt respectively, where the multiplier process {ϕt}
is specified recursively by the relation31
ϕt = µϕt−1 − qpi
∞∑
j=0
βjµj+1Etut+j. (3.59)
Here µ is the root of (3.57) that satisfies −1 < µ < 1, and the initial value
ϕt0−1 is chosen so that the solution is consistent with the precommitted value
for p¯it0 .
We note that even in the special case that wages and prices are “equally
sticky,” optimal policy will not involve complete stabilization of any weighted
average of wages and prices. Instead, the optimal evolution of p¯it will depend
on the history of cost-push disturbances. The optimal evolution of any other
index of wages and prices will depend both on this and the exogenous deter-
minants of real wages, and since different real disturbances will affect ut and
the real wage ωR,t in different ways, there will not generally be any index of
wages and prices that will remain constant in the optimal equilibrium.
3.2 The General Case
More generally, to derive the optimal policy we can write the Lagrangian as
Lt0 = Et0{
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0
qy
2
x2t +
qp
2
pi2p,t +
qw
2
pi2w,t + ϕp,t(pip,t − κpxt − ξpωˆR,t − βpip,t+1)
+ϕw,t(piw,t − κwxt + ξwωˆR,t − βpiw,t+1) + ϕr,t(ωˆR,t − ωˆR,t−1 − piw,t + pip,t) +
+ϕ1,t0−1pip,t0 + ϕ2,t0−1piw,t0}.
31Details of this derivation are given in the appendix.
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The first-order conditions obtained by differentiation are then
qyxt − κpϕp,t − κwϕw,t = 0; (3.60)
qppip,t + ϕp,t − ϕp,t−1 + ϕr,t = 0; (3.61)
qwpiw,t + ϕw,t − ϕw,t−1 − ϕr,t = 0; (3.62)
ξpϕp,t − ξwϕw,t − ϕr,t + βEtϕr,t+1 = 0, (3.63)
for each t ≥ t0. The first-order conditions (3.60) to (3.63) together with
the structural equations (2.50), (2.49) and (2.45) need to be solve for the
optimal path of the lagrange multipliers {ϕp,t, ϕw,t, ϕr,t} and the variables
{xt, pip,t, piw,t, wR,t} given the initial conditions (2.47). We note that the
initial conditions can similarly be expressed as a constraint on the path of
the multipliers
ϕp,t0 − ϕp,t0−1 + ϕr,t0 = −qpp¯ip,t0 ,
ϕw,t0 − ϕw,t0−1 − ϕr,t0 = −qwp¯iw,t0 .
We show in the appendix that we can express the above conditions as a
linear system of the form[
A1 0
0 A4
]
Et
(
z1,t+1
z2,t
)
=
[
B1 B2
B3 B4
](
z1,t
z2,t−1
)
+
[
C1
C2
]
υt,
for matrices defined in the appendix, where
z′1,t ≡ [ϕp,t ϕw,t ϕr,t],
z′2,t−1 ≡ [ωˆR,t−1 ϕp,t−1 ϕw,t−1]
and
υ′t ≡ [ωˆnt up,t uw,t].
The determinacy of the equilibrium depends on the roots of the characteristic
equation associated with the system (A.67)
det(B − µA) = 0.
Rational-expectations equilibrium is determinate if the number of roots µi
such that |µi| < 1 is exactly equal to the number of predetermined variables,
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which in this case is three. Under this condition, we show in the appendix
that the unique non-explosive solution is of the form
z1,t = −(V A)−11 (V A)2z2,t−1 − (V A)−11 Et
∞∑
j=0
Φ−(j+1)V Cυt+j, (3.64)
z2,t = A
−1
4 (B4−B3(V A)−11 (V A)2)z2,t−1+A−14 C2υt−A−14 B3(V A)−11 Et
∞∑
j=0
Φ−(j+1)V Cυt+j,
(3.65)
for matrices again defined in the appendix. Using (3.60) to (3.63) and (3.64),
(3.65) we can obtain the optimal paths of the variables {xt, pip,t, piw,t, wR,t}.
3.3 Optimal Targeting Rules
Finally, following Giannoni and Woodford (2003), we can use the first-order
conditions to eliminate the three Lagrange multipliers, obtaining a target
criterion of the form
(κw−κp)piasymt +(ξp+ξw)qt+(κw−κp){Et[βqt+1−qt]−Et−1[βqt−qt−1]} = 0,
(3.66)
where
piasymt ≡ qpξppip,t − qwξwpiw,t
is a measure of the asymmetry between price and wage inflation,
pisymt ≡
qpξppip,t + qwξwpiw,t
qpξp + qwξw
is a average of the rates of price and wage inflation, and
qt ≡ (qpξp + qwξw)
[
pisymt +
qy
qpξp + qwξw
(xt − xt−1)
]
.
This criterion holds at all times in the optimal equilibrium, and a com-
mitment to use monetary policy to ensure that it holds ensures that the
only non-explosive rational-expectations equilibrium consistent with the pol-
icy will be the optimal one. In the special case analyzed above in which
κw = κp = κ > 0, the optimal target criterion reduces to qt = 0, or
pisymt +
qy
qpξp + qwξw
(xt − xt−1) = 0. (3.67)
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This again allows us to consider the degree to which simple policy rules
of either of the two kinds discussed by Erceg et al. are likely to provide close
approximations to optimal policy in the general case. In the special case
that wages and prices are “equally sticky”, there is a linear combination of
wage inflation, price inflation and the output gap that it would be optimal
to stabilize, given by the optimal target criterion (3.67). However, all three
target variables enter with non-zero weights in this criterion, and because
real disturbances should influence these three variables in two distinct ways
in the optimal equilibrium (both through their effects on the cost-push terms
and through their effects on the natural real wage), as discussed in the pre-
vious section, it will not generally be possible to closely approximate any
one of them by a linear combination of the other two (except for the relation
implied by this target criterion itself). Hence one should not expect optimal
policy to be well-characterized by a rule that stabilizes any linear combina-
tion of wage inflation and price inflation alone, or by a rule that stabilizes a
linear combination of price inflation and the output gap alone. In the more
general case, optimal policy cannot even be characterized by a static relation
between all three variables; but there is even less reason to believe that a
good approximation to optimal policy can be obtained without reference to
all three variables.
4 Conclusion
We have shown how to extend the analysis of Erceg et al. to treat the case
in which the steady-state equilibrium level of output under a policy that
maintains zero inflation is suboptimal, due to tax distortions and market
power, and in which, as a consequence, the effects of stabilization policy on
the average level of output are important for the welfare evaluation of such
policies. Even in this case, it is possible to approximate the expected utility of
the representative household by a purely quadratic objective, so that welfare
can be evaluated, to second-order accuracy, using only a first-order accurate
solution for the equilibrium implied by a given policy rule.
As in the case of an efficient steady state treated by Erceg et al., the
welfare-theoretic loss function can be expressed as a sum of three quadratic
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terms, indicating the distortions due to non-zero levels of wage inflation,
price inflation and an appropriately defined output gap, respectively. The
inefficiency of the steady state does not change the general form of the loss
function, but it does have quantitative implications for both the weights on
each of the three stabilization objectives, and for the definition of the target
level of output, deviations from which define the welfare-relevant output gap.
An important consequence of a distorted steady state is that except under
extremely special circumstances, one cannot expect real disturbances to move
the target level of output and the natural rate of output (the equilibrium
output level in the case of flexible wages and prices) to the same extent.
This means that almost any kind of real disturbances will create a tension
between the objectives of stabilizing the welfare-relevant output gap on the
one hand and stabilizing wage and price inflation and the other. As a result,
it is likely that neither of the kinds of simple rules considered by Erceg et al.
— rules that stabilize a weighted average of wage and price inflation with
no reference to the output gap, and rules that stabilize a weighted average
of price inflation and the output gap with no reference to wage inflation —
will come as close to approximating fully optimal policy in an economy with
a distorted steady state as in the numerical examples that they consider.
Nonetheless, the most important of the conclusions of Erceg et al. remain
valid. The stickiness of wages implies that variations in the rate of wage
inflation are as closely related to distortions that monetary policy should
seek to mitigate as are variations in price inflation, and as a consequence,
a strict (goods-price) inflation target will not be optimal. Indeed, we have
shown that in the more general model considered here, optimal policy can be
characterized by a targeting rule, but the optimal target criterion generally
involves the projected paths of price inflation, wage inflation, and the output
gap. The welfare gains from adoption of a more sophisticated form of inflation
target may be substantial; and our analysis suggests that they may be even
larger when one takes account of the likely degree of distortion of the steady-
state level of output in a realistic model.
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A Appendix
A.1 The deterministic steady state
Here we show the existence of a steady state, i.e., of an optimal policy (under
appropriate initial conditions) of the recursive policy problem that involves
constant values of all variables. We consider a deterministic problem in which
the exogenous disturbances C¯t, Gt, H¯t, At, τt each take constant values C¯, H¯,
A¯, τ¯ > 0 and G¯ ≥ 0 for all t ≥ t0. We wish to find an initial degree of price
and wage dispersions ∆p,t0−1, ∆w,t0−1, initial real wage wR,t0−1 ≡ Wt0−1/Pt0−1
and initial commitments Xt0 = X¯ such that the recursive (or “stage two”)
problem involves a constant policy xt0 = x¯, Xt+1 = X¯ each period, in which
∆¯p, ∆¯w and w¯ are equal to the initial values.
We thus consider the problem of maximizing
Ut0 =
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0U(Yt,∆p,t,∆w,t) (A.1)
subject to the constraints
Kp,tp(Πp,t)
1+ωpθp
θp−1 = Fp,t, (A.2)
Fp,t = (1− τ¯)uy(Yt − G¯)Yt + αpβΠθp−1p,t+1Fp,t+1, (A.3)
Kp,t = φµpuy(Yt − G¯)wR,tY φt A¯−φ + αpβΠθp(1+ωp)p,t+1 Kp,t+1, (A.4)
∆p,t = αp∆p,t−1Π
θp(1+ωp)
p,t + (1− αp)p(Πp,t)−
θp(1+ωp)
1−θp , (A.5)
Kw,tp(Πw,t)
1+νθw
θw−1 = Fw,t, (A.6)
Fw,t = uy(Yt − G¯)Y φt A¯−φ∆p,twR,t + αwβΠθw−1w,t+1Fw,t+1, (A.7)
Kw,t = µwvh(Y
φ
t )Y
φ
t A¯
−φ(1+ν)∆1+νp,t + αwβΠ
θw(1+ν)
w,t+1 Kw,t+1, (A.8)
∆w,t = αw∆w,t−1Π
θw(1+ν)
w,t + (1− αw)p(Πw,t)−
θw(1+ν)
1−θw , (A.9)
wR,t =
Πw,t
Πp,t
wR,t−1, (A.10)
and given the specified initial conditions ∆p,t0−1,∆w,t0−1, wR,t0−1, Xt0 where
we have defined
p(Πp,t) ≡
(
1− αpΠθp−1p,t
1− αp
)
,
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p(Πw,t) ≡
(
1− αwΠθw−1w,t
1− αw
)
.
We introduce Lagrange multipliers φ1t through φ9t corresponding to con-
straints (A.2) through (A.10) respectively. We also introduce multipliers
dated t0 corresponding to the constraints implied by the initial conditions
Xt0 = X¯; the latter multipliers are normalized in such a way that the first-
order conditions take the same form at date t0 as at all later dates. The
first-order conditions of the maximization problem are then the following.
The one with respect to Yt is
0 = Uy(Yt,∆p,t,∆w,t)− (1− τ¯)[uyy(Yt − G¯)Yt + uy(Yt − G¯)]φ2,t
−φµpA¯−φwR,t[uyy(Yt − G¯)Y φt + φY φ−1t uy(Yt − G¯)]φ3,t +
−A¯−φwR,t∆p,t[uyy(Yt − G¯)Y φt + φY φ−1t uy(Yt − G¯)]φ6,t
−µwA¯−φ(1+ν)∆1+νp,t [φvhh(Y φt )Y 2φ−1t + φvh(Y φt )Y φ−1t ]φ7,t (A.11)
that with respect to ∆p,t is
0 = U∆p(Yt,∆p,t,∆w,t) + φ4t − αpβΠθp(1+ωp)p,t+1 φ4,t+1 − uy(Yt − G¯)Y φt A¯−φwR,tφ6,t
−(1 + ν)µwvh(Y φt )A¯−φ(1+ν)Y φt ∆νp,tφ7,t (A.12)
that with respect to Πp,t is
1 + ωpθp
θp − 1 p(Πp,t)
(1+ωpθp)
θp−1 −1ppi(Πp,t)Kp,tφ1,t − αp(θp − 1)Πθp−2p,t Fp,tφ2,t−1
−θp(1 + ωp)αpΠθp(1+ωp)−1p,t Kp,tφ3,t−1 − θp(1 + ωp)αp∆p,t−1Πθp(1+ωp)−1p,t φ4,t+
−θp(1 + ωp)
θp − 1 (1− αp)p(Πp,t)
(1+ωpθp)
θp−1 ppi(Πp,t)φ4,t +Πw,tΠ
−2
p,twR,t−1φ9,t = 0;
(A.13)
that with respect to Fp,t is
−φ1,t + φ2,t − αpΠθp−1p,t φ2,t−1 = 0; (A.14)
that with respect to Kp,t is
p(Πp,t)
1+ωpθp
θp−1 φ1,t + φ3t − αpΠθp(1+ωp)p,t φ3,t−1 = 0; (A.15)
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that with respect to ∆w,t is
0 = U∆w(Yt,∆p,t,∆w,t) + φ8,t − αwβΠθw(1+ν)w,t+1 φ8,t+1 (A.16)
that with respect to Πw,t is
1 + νθw
θw − 1 p(Πw,t)
(1+νθw)
θw−1 −1ppi(Πw,t)Kw,tφ5,t − αw(θw − 1)Πθw−2w,t Fw,tφ6,t−1
−θw(1 + ν)αwΠθw(1+ν)−1w,t Kw,tφ7,t−1 − θw(1 + ν)αw∆w,t−1Πθw(1+ν)−1w,t φ8,t+
−θw(1 + ν)
θw − 1 (1− αw)p(Πw,t)
(1+νθw)
θw−1 ppi(Πw,t)φ8,t − Π−1p,twR,t−1φ9,t = 0; (A.17)
that with respect to Fw,t is
−φ5,t + φ6,t − αwΠθw−1w,t φ6,t−1 = 0; (A.18)
that with respect to Kw,t is
p(Πw,t)
1+νθw
θw−1 φ5,t + φ7,t − αwΠθw(1+ν)w,t φ7,t−1 = 0; (A.19)
that with respect to wR,t is
0 = −φµpuy(Yt − G¯)Y φt A¯−φφ3,t − uy(Yt − G¯)Y φt A¯−φ∆p,tφ6,t
+φ9,t − βΠw,tΠ−1p,tφ9,t+1 (A.20)
We search for a solution to these first-order conditions in which Πp,t =
Πw,t = Π¯, ∆p,t = ∆¯p, ∆w,t = ∆¯w, wR,t = w¯R, Yt = Y¯ at all times. A
steady-state solution of this kind also requires that the Lagrange multipliers
take constant values. We furthermore conjecture the existence of a solution
in which Π¯ = 1, as stated in the text. Note that such a solution implies
that ∆¯p = ∆¯w = 1, p(Π¯p) = 1, p(Π¯w) = 1, ppi(Π¯p) = −(θp − 1)αp/(1 − αp),
ppi(Π¯w) = −(θw − 1)αw/(1 − αw) and K¯p = F¯p and K¯w = F¯w. Using these
substitutions, we find that (the steady-state version of) each of the first-order
conditions (A.11) – (A.20) is satisfied if the steady-state values satisfy
0 = Uy(Y¯ , 1, 1)− (1− τ¯)[uyy(Y¯ − G¯))Y¯ + uy(Y¯ − G¯))]φ2 +
+φµwµpA¯
−φ(1+ν)[φvhh(Y¯ φ)Y¯ 2φ−1 + φvh(Y¯ φ)Y¯ φ−1]φ2
(1− αpβ)φ4 = −U∆p(Y¯ , 1) + uy(Y¯ − G¯)A¯−φY¯ φw¯Rφ6
−(1 + ν)µwvh(Y¯ φ)A¯−φ(1+ν)Y¯ φφ6,
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φ1 = (1− αp)φ2,
φ3 = −φ2,
(1− αwβ)φ8 = −U∆w(Y¯ , 1, 1)
φ5 = (1− αw)φ6,
φ7 = −φ6
φ6 = φµpφ2
φ9 = 0
These equations can obviously be solved (uniquely) for the steady-state mul-
tipliers, given any value Y¯ > 0 and w¯R > 0.
Similarly, (the steady-state versions of) the constraints (A.2) – (A.10) are
satisfied if
(1− τ¯)Y¯ 1−φ = φµpw¯RA¯−φ (A.21)
uy(Y¯ − G¯)A¯−φw¯R = µwvh(Y¯ φ)A¯−φ(1+ν). (A.22)
Substituting (A.21) into (A.22) we can obtain
(1− τ¯)
φµpµw
uy(Y¯ − G¯)Y¯ = vh
((
Y¯
A¯
)φ)(
Y¯
A¯
)φ
,
which can be solved for the steady-state value Y¯ . Then either (A.21) or
(A.22) can be solved to obtain the steady-state value w¯R given Y¯ .
A.2 A second-order approximation to utility (equa-
tions (2.30) and (2.33))
We derive here equations (2.30) and (2.33) in the main text, taking a second-
order approximation to (equation (1.13)) following the treatment in Wood-
ford (2003, chapter 6). We start by approximating the expected discounted
value of the sum of the utilities of the households (the policy-objective func-
tion)
Ut0 = Et0
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0
[
u(Yt; ξt)−
∫ 1
0
v(ht(j); ξt)dj
]
. (A.23)
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First we note that∫ 1
0
v(ht(j); ξt)dj =
λ
1 + ν
H1+νt ∆w,tH¯
−ν
t = v(Ht; ξt)∆w,t
where ∆w,t is the measure of price dispersion defined in the text. We can
then write (A.23) as
Ut0 = Et0
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0 [u(Yt; ξt)− v(Ht; ξt)∆w,t] . (A.24)
The first term in (A.24) can be approximated using a second-order Taylor
expansion around the steady state defined in the previous section as
u(Yt; ξt) = u¯+ u¯cY˜t + u¯ξξt +
1
2
u¯ccY˜
2
t + u¯cξξtY˜t +
1
2
ξ′tu¯ξξξt +O(||ξ||3)
= u¯+ Y¯ u¯c · (Yˆt + 1
2
Yˆ 2t ) + u¯ξξt +
1
2
Y¯ u¯ccYˆ
2
t +
+Y¯ u¯cξξtYˆt +
1
2
ξ′tu¯ξξξt +O(||ξ||3)
= Y¯ ucYˆt +
1
2
[Y¯ u¯c + Y¯
2u¯cc]Yˆ
2
t − Y¯ 2u¯ccgtYˆt + t.i.p.+O(||ξ||3)
= Y¯ u¯c
{
Yˆt +
1
2
(1− σ−1)Yˆ 2t + σ−1gtYˆt
}
+
+t.i.p.+O(||ξ||3), (A.25)
where a bar denotes the steady-state value for each variable, a tilde denotes
the deviation of the variable from its steady-state value (e.g., Y˜t ≡ Yt − Y¯ ),
and a hat refers to the log deviation of the variable from its steady-state value
(e.g., Yˆt ≡ lnYt/Y¯ ). We use ξt to refer to the entire vector of exogenous
shocks,
ξ′t ≡
[
Gˆ gt qt τˆt h¯t at
]
,
in which Gˆt ≡ (Gt − G¯)/Y , gt ≡ Gˆt + sC c¯t, ω ≡ (φ − 1) + φν, ωqt ≡
νh¯t + φ(1 + ν)at, τˆt ≡ (τt − τ¯)/τ¯ , c¯t ≡ ln C¯t/C¯, at ≡ lnAt/A¯, h¯t ≡ ln H¯t/H¯.
Moreover, we use the definitions σ−1 ≡ σ˜−1s−1C with sC ≡ C¯/Y¯ . We have
used the Taylor expansion
Yt/Y¯ = 1 + Yˆt +
1
2
Yˆ 2t +O(||ξ||3)
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to get a relation for Y˜t in terms of Yˆt. Finally the term “t.i.p.” denotes terms
that are independent of policy, and may accordingly be suppressed as far as
the welfare ranking of alternative policies is concerned.
We may similarly approximate v(Ht; ξt)∆w,t by
v(Ht; ξt)∆w,t = v¯ + v¯(∆w,t − 1) + v¯h(Ht − H¯) + v¯h(∆w,t − 1)(Ht − H¯) + (∆w,t − 1)v¯ξξt +
+
1
2
v¯hh(Ht − H¯)2 + (Ht − H¯)v¯hξξt + 1
2
ξ′tv¯ξξξt+O(||ξ||3)
= v¯(∆w,t − 1) + v¯hH¯
(
Hˆt +
1
2
Hˆ2t
)
+ v¯h(∆w,t − 1)H¯Hˆt + (∆w,t − 1)v¯ξξt +
+
1
2
v¯hhH¯
2Hˆ2t + H¯Hˆtv¯hξξt + t.i.p.+O(||ξ||3)
= v¯hH¯[
∆ˆw,t
1 + ν
+ Hˆt +
1
2
(1 + ν)Hˆ2t + ∆ˆw,tHˆt − νHˆth¯t +
− ∆ˆw,t
1 + ν
νh¯t] + t.i.p.+O(||ξ||3).
We take a second-order expansion of (1.20), obtaining
∆ˆw,t = αw∆ˆw,t−1 +
αw
1− αw θw(1 + ν)(1 + νθw)
pi2w,t
2
+O(||ξ||3), (A.26)
from which it follows that ∆ˆw,t is a second-order terms (since the equation
can be solved backward from date t0 − 1 and written showing ∆ˆw,t as a
function of t.i.p. and quadratic terms). We now use (1.10) that in an exact
form implies that
Hˆt = φ(Yˆt − at) + ∆ˆp,t
We take a second-order expansion of (1.28), obtaining
∆ˆp,t = αp∆ˆp,t−1 +
αp
1− αp θp(1 + ωp)(1 + ωpθp)
pi2p,t
2
+O(||ξ||3), (A.27)
from which it follows that also ∆ˆp,t is a second-order term for the same
reasons as above. This implies that
Hˆ2t = φ
2(Yˆ 2t − 2atYˆt) +O(||ξ||3)
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These results in turn allow us to approximate v(Ht; ξt)∆w,t
v(Ht; ξt)∆w,t = v¯hH¯φ
{
∆ˆw,t
φ(1 + ν)
+ Yˆt +
∆ˆp,t
φ
+
1
2
(1 + ν)φ(Yˆ 2t − 2atYˆt)− νYˆth¯t
}
+
+t.i.p.+O(||ξ||3),
= (1− Φ)u¯cY¯
{
∆ˆw,t
1 + ω
+ Yˆt +
∆ˆp,t
φ
+
1
2
(1 + ω)Yˆ 2t − ωqtYˆt
}
+
+t.i.p.+O(||ξ||3) (A.28)
where we have used the steady state relation v¯hH¯φ = (1− Φ)u¯cY¯ where
Φ ≡ 1−
(
θp − 1
θp
)(
θw − 1
θw
)
(1− τ¯) < 1
measures the inefficiency of steady-state output Y¯ .
Combining (A.25) and (A.28), we finally obtain equation (2.30) in the
text,
Ut0 = Y¯ u¯c · Et0
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0ΦYˆt − 1
2
uyyYˆ
2
t + Yˆtuyξξt − u∆p∆ˆp,t − u∆w∆ˆw,t
+ t.i.p. +O(||ξ||3), (A.29)
where
uyy ≡ (ω + σ−1)− Φ(1 + ω),
uyξξt ≡ [σ−1gt + (1− Φ)ωqt],
u∆w ≡ (1− Φ)
1 + ω
,
u∆p ≡ (1− Φ)
φ
.
We finally observe that (A.26) and (A.27) can be integrated to obtain
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0 ∆ˆw,t =
αw
(1− αw)(1− αwβ)θw(1+ν)(1+νθw)
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0
pi2w,t
2
+t.i.p.+O(||ξ||3),
(A.30)
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0 ∆ˆp,t =
αp
(1− αp)(1− αpβ)θp(1+ωp)(1+ωpθp)
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0
pi2p,t
2
+t.i.p.+O(||ξ||3),
(A.31)
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where pip,t ≡ lnPt/Pt−1 and piw,t ≡ lnWt/Wt−1.
By substituting (A.30) and (A.31) into (A.29), we obtain
Ut0 = Y¯ u¯c · Et0
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0 [ΦYˆt − 1
2
uyyYˆ
2
t + Yˆtuyξξt −
1
2
upippi
2
p,t −
1
2
upiwpi
2
w,t]
+t.i.p. +O(||ξ||3).
This coincides with equation (2.33) in the text, where we have further defined
ξp ≡ (1− αpβ)(1− αp)
αp(1 + θpωp)
,
ξw ≡ (1− αwβ)(1− αw)
αw(1 + θpν)
,
upip ≡
θp(1− Φ)
ξp
,
upiw ≡
θw(1− Φ)
ξwφ
.
A.3 A second-order approximation to the AS equa-
tions (equations (1.19) and (1.27))
Here we need to take approximations of two similar equations of the form
Γj,t ≡
(
1− αjΠθj−1j,t
1− αj
)− 1+ωjθj
θj−1
=
(
Fj,t
Kj,t
)−1
for j = p,w. In what follows, ωw = ν. We show below that we can do it
just once and take care of the difference with some additional notation. We
further re-define the variables Fj,t and Kj,t as
Fj,t ≡ Et
{ ∞∑
T=t
(αjβ)
T−tf jt,T
}
,
Kj,t ≡ Et
{ ∞∑
T=t
(αjβ)
T−tkjt,T
}
,
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with
fpt,T ≡ (1− τT )C−σ˜
−1
T C¯
σ˜−1
T YTP
1−θp
t,T , (A.32)
kpt,T ≡ φµpC−σ˜
−1
T C¯
σ˜−1
T wR,TY
φ
T A
−φ
T P
−θp(1+ωp)
t,T , (A.33)
fwt,T ≡ C−σ˜
−1
T C¯
σ˜−1
T Y
φ
T A
−φ
T ∆p,TwR,TW
1−θw
t,T (A.34)
kwt,T ≡ λµwY φ(1+ν)T H¯−νt A−φ(1+ν)T ∆1+νp,T W−θw(1+ν)t,T (A.35)
where we have defined Pt,T ≡ Pt/PT , Wt,T ≡ Wt/WT . We can then obtain
in an exact log-linear form that
Γˆj,t + Fˆj,t = Kˆj,t. (A.36)
We take a second-order expansion of Fj,t and Kj,t, obtaining
Fˆj,t +
1
2
Fˆ 2j,t = (1− αjβ)Et
{
+∞∑
T=t
(αjβ)
T−t(fˆ jt,T +
1
2
(fˆ jt,T )
2)
}
+O(||ξ||3), (A.37)
Kˆj,t +
1
2
Kˆ2j,t = (1− αjβ)Et
{
+∞∑
T=t
(αjβ)
T−t(kˆjt,T +
1
2
(kˆjt,T )
2)
}
+O(||ξ||3). (A.38)
Plugging (A.37) and (A.38) into (A.36), we obtain
Γˆj,t = (1− αjβ)Et
{
+∞∑
T=t
(αjβ)
T−t(kˆjt,T − fˆ jt,T )
}
+
+
(1− αjβ)
2
Et
{
+∞∑
T=t
(αβ)T−t((kˆjt,T )
2 − (fˆ jt,T )2)
}
+
1
2
(Fˆj,t − Kˆj,t)(Fˆj,t + Kˆj,t) +O(||ξ||3). (A.39)
We note that in an exact log-linear form
kˆpt,T − fˆpt,T = −(1 + ωpθp)Pˆt,T + wˆR,T + φ(YˆT − aT )− YˆT − SˆT ,
kˆwt,T − fˆwt,T = −(1 + νθw)Wˆt,T + φνYˆT − νhT − φνaT + ν∆ˆp,T − wˆR,T
+σ˜−1(CˆT − c¯T ),
43
where Sˆt ≡ ln(1− τt)/(1− τ¯).
Furthermore we obtain that
kˆpt,T + fˆ
p
t,T = (1 + φ)YˆT − φaT + (1− 2θp − ωpθp)Pˆt,T + SˆT − 2σ˜−1(CˆT − c¯T ) + wˆR,T
= Xp,T + (1− 2θp − ωpθp)Pˆt,T ,
kˆwt,T + fˆ
w
t,T = φ(2 + ν)YˆT + (2 + ν)∆ˆT − νh¯T − φ(2 + ν)aT + wˆR,T +
(1− 2θw − νθw)Wˆt,T − σ˜−1(CˆT − c¯T )
= Xw,T + (1− 2θw − νθw)Wˆt,T ,
where we have defined
Xp,T ≡ (1 + φ)YˆT − φaT + SˆT − 2σ˜−1(CˆT − c¯T ) + wˆR,T .
Xw,T ≡ φ(2 + ν)YˆT + (2 + ν)∆ˆT − νht − φ(2 + ν)at + wˆR,T − σ˜−1(CˆT − c¯T ).
We can then substitute into (A.39) and get
1
(1− αβ)Γˆj,t = −
1
2
Γˆj,tZj,t + Et
+∞∑
T=t
(αjβ)
T−t(kˆjt,T − fˆ jt,T ) +
+
1
2
Et
+∞∑
T=t
(αjβ)
T−t[(kˆjt,T − fˆ jt,T )][Xj,T + (1− 2θj − ωjθj)Pˆ jt,T ] +
+O(||ξ||3), (A.40)
where we use the definition Pˆwt,T = Wˆt,T and
Zj,t ≡ Et
+∞∑
T=t
(αjβ)
T−t[Xj,T + (1− 2θj − ωjθj)Pˆ jt,T ].
By using (A.40), and defining
zj,T ≡ kˆjt,T − fˆ jt,T + (1 + ωjθj)Pˆ jt,T ,
we can write
Γˆj,t
(1− αjβ) = zj,t +
αjβ
(1− αjβ)Et(Γˆj,t+1 − (1 + ωjθj)Pˆ
j
t,t+1)−
1
2
Γˆj,tZj,t +
1
2
αjβEtΓˆj,t+1Zj,t+1 +
+
1
2
zj,tXj,t +
αjβ
2
Et{
+∞∑
T=t+1
(αjβ)
T−t−1(1 + ωjθj)(1− 2θj − ωjθj)(−Pˆ j2t,t+1 +
−2Pˆ jt,t+1Pˆ jt+1,T )− (1 + ωjθj)Pˆ jt,t+1Xj,T + (1− 2θj − ωjθj)Pˆ jt,t+1zj,T}+O(||ξ||3),
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which can be simplified to
Γˆj,t
(1− αjβ) = zj,t + αjβ
1
(1− αjβ)Et(Γˆj,t+1 − (1 + ωjθj)Pˆ
j
t,t+1) +
1
2
zj,tXj,t +
−1
2
Γˆj,tZj,t +
1
2
αjβEt{(Γˆj,t+1 − (1 + ωjθj)Pˆ jt,t+1)Zj,t+1}
+
αjβ
2(1− αjβ)(1− 2θj − ωjθj)Et{(Γˆj,t+1 − (1 + ωjθj)Pˆ
j
t,t+1)Pˆ
j
t,t+1}+
+O(||ξ||3), (A.41)
We next take a second-order expansion of Γˆj,t
Γˆj,t
(1 + ωjθj)
=
αj
1− αj pij,t −
1− θj
2
αj
(1− αj)2pi
2
j,t +O(||ξ||3), (A.42)
and note that and Pˆ jt−1,t = −pij,t. We can then plug (A.42) into (A.41)
obtaining
pij,t =
1− θj,t
2
1
(1− αj)pi
2
j,t + ξjzj,t + βEtpij,t+1 −
1− θj
2
αjβ
(1− αj)Etpi
2
j,t+1
+
1
2
ξjzj,tXj,t − 1
2
(1− αjβ)pij,tZj,t + β
2
(1− αjβ)Et{pij,t+1Zj,t+1}
−β
2
(1− 2θj − ωjθj)Et{pi2j,t+1}+O(||ξ||3). (A.43)
By integrating equation (A.43) forward from time t0 we can finally obtain
Vj,t0 = ξjEt0
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0zj,t +
1
2
ξjEt0
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0zj,tXj,t
+
θj(1 + ωj)
2
Et0
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0pi2j,t +O(||ξ||3), (A.44)
where
Vj,t0 ≡ pij,t0 −
1− θj
2(1− αj)pi
2
j,t0
+
(1− αjβ)
2
pij,t0Zj,t0 +
θj(1 + ωj)
2
pi2j,t0
and
Zj,t = Xj,t − αjβ
1− αjβ (1− 2θj − ωjθj)Etpij,t+1 + αjβEtZj,t+1.
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Finally, we can take a second-order approximation of the relation between
output and consumption Yt = Ct +Gt obtaining
Cˆt = s
−1
C Yˆt−s−1C Gˆt+
s−1C (1− s−1C )
2
Yˆ 2t +s
−2
C YˆtGˆt+s.o.t.i.p.+O(||ξ||3), (A.45)
while
Sˆt = −ωτ τˆt + s.o.t.i.p.+O(||ξ||3), (A.46)
where ωτ ≡ τ¯ /(1− τ¯). By substituting (A.45) and (A.46) into the definition
of zj,t and Zj,t in (A.43), we finally obtain a quadratic approximation to the
AS relations. For the price constraint we obtain.
Vp,t0 = ξpEt0
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0 [(φ− 1)Yˆt − φat + wˆR,t + ωτ τˆt]
+
1
2
ξpEt0
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0{[φ2 − 1− 2σ−1(φ− 1)]Yˆ 2t + 2[φ− σ−1]wˆR,tYˆt + wˆ2R,t}
+ξpEt0
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0{[σ−1gt − φat]wˆR,t + [φ(σ−1 − φ)at + σ−1(φ− 1)gt + (1− σ−1)ωτ τˆt]Yˆt}
+
θp(1 + ωp)
2
Et0
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0pi2p,t + s.o.t.i.p.+O(||ξ||3), (A.47)
This can be expressed compactly in the form
Vp,t0 = Et0
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0ξp(c′p,xxt + cp,ξξt +
1
2
x′tCp,xxxt − x′tCp,xξξt +
1
2
cp,pippi
2
p,t)
+s.o.t.i.p.+O(||ξ||3) (A.48)
or as
Vp,t = ξp(c
′
p,xxt + cp,ξξt +
1
2
x′tCp,xxxt − x′tCp,xξξt +
1
2
cp,pippi
2
p,t) + βEtVp,t+1
+s.o.t.i.p.+O(||ξ||3) (A.49)
where we have defined
c′p,x ≡
[
(φ− 1) 1
]
cp,ξξt ≡ −φat + ωτ τˆt,
46
Cp,xx ≡
[
φ2 − 1− 2σ−1(φ− 1) φ− σ−1
φ− σ−1 1
]
Cp,xξ ≡
[
0 −σ−1(φ− 1) 0 −(1− σ−1)ωτ 0 0 −φ(σ−1 − φ)
0 −σ−1 0 0 0 0 φ
]
cp,pi ≡ θp(1 + ωp)
ξp
and
Vp,t = pip,t +
1
2
vpippi
2
p,t + vp,zpip,tZp,t,
Zp,t = zp,yYˆt + zp,rwˆR,t + zpippip,t + zp,ξξt + αpβEtZp,t+1,
in which the coefficients are defined as
vp,pi ≡ θp(1 + ωp)− 1− θp
(1− αp) , vp,z ≡
(1− αpβ)
2
,
vp,k ≡ ξpαp
1− αpβ (1− 2θp − ωpθp),
zp,y ≡ (1 + φ− 2σ−1) + vp,k(ω + σ−1)
zp,r ≡ (1 + vp,k)
zp,ξξt ≡ 2σ−1gt − φ(1 + vp,k)at − ωτ (1− vp,k)τˆt,
zp,pi ≡ −vp,k
ξp
.
Note that in a first-order approximation, (A.49) can be written simply as
pip,t = ξp[(φ− 1)Yˆt + wˆR,t + cp,ξξt] + βEtpip,t+1. (A.50)
We can also write (A.48) as
Vt0 = Et0
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0ξp(c′p,xxt +
1
2
x′tCp,xxxt − x′tCp,xξξt +
1
2
cp,pippi
2
p,t)
+t.i.p.+O(||ξ||3), (A.51)
where the term cξξt is now included in terms independent of policy. (Such
terms matter when part of the log-linear constraints, as in the case of (A.50),
but not when part of the quadratic objective.)
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For the wage constraint we obtain that
Vw,t0 = ξwEt0
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0 [(φν + σ−1)Yˆt − wˆR,t − φνat − σ−1gt − νht]
+
1
2
ξwEt0
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0{[(φ(2 + ν)− σ−1)(φν + σ−1)) + σ−1(1− s−1C )]Yˆ 2t
−2[φ− σ−1]wˆR,tYˆt − wˆ2R,t}
+ξwEt0
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0 [−σ−1gt + φat]wˆR,t +
+ξwEt0
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0 [σ−1(σ−1 − φ)gt − φν(1 + ν)ht + σ−1s−1C Gˆt]Yˆt
−ξwEt0
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0φ[2φν + φν2 + σ−1]atYˆt +
θw(1 + ν)
2
Et0
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0pi2w,t
+
θpν(1 + ωp)ξw
ξp
Et0
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0pi2p,t + s.o.t.i.p.+O(||ξ||3),
This can be expressed compactly in the form
Vw,t0 = Et0
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0ξw(c′w,xxt + cw,ξξt +
1
2
x′tCw,xxxt − x′tCw,xξξt +
1
2
cw,piwpi
2
w,t +
1
2
cw,pippi
2
p,t)
+s.o.t.i.p.+O(||ξ||3) (A.52)
or as
Vw,t = ξw(c
′
w,xxt + cw,ξξt +
1
2
x′tCw,xxxt − x′tCw,xξξt +
1
2
cw,piwpi
2
w,t +
1
2
cw,pippi
2
p,t) + βEtVw,t+1
+s.o.t.i.p.+O(||ξ||3) (A.53)
where we have defined
c′w,x ≡
[
φν + σ−1 −1
]
cw,ξξt ≡ −φνat − σ−1gt − νht,
Cw,xx ≡
[
(φ(2 + ν)− σ−1)(φν + σ−1) + σ−1(1− s−1C ) −(φ− σ−1)
−(φ− σ−1) −1
]
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Cw,xξ ≡
[
−σ−1s−1C −σ−1(σ−1 − φ) 0 0 φν(1 + ν) φ[2φν + φν2 + σ−1]
0 σ−1 0 0 0 −φ
]
cw,piw ≡
θw(1 + ν)
ξw
cw,pip ≡
θpν(1 + ωp)
ξp
and
Vw,t = piw,t +
1
2
vw,pipi
2
w,t + vw,zpiw,tZw,t,
Zw,t = zw,yYˆt + zw,rwˆR,t + zw,pipiw,t + zw,ξξt + αwβEtZw,t+1,
in which the coefficients are defined as
vw,pi ≡ θw(1 + ωw)− 1− θw
(1− αw) , vw,z ≡
(1− αwβ)
2
,
vw,k ≡ αwξw
1− αwβ (1− 2θw − νθw),
zw,y ≡ φ(2 + ν)− σ−1 + vw,k(φν + σ−1)
zw,ξξt ≡ σ−1(1− vw,k)gt − ν(1 + vw,k)h¯t − [φ(2 + v) + φνvw,k]at,
zw,pi ≡ −vw,k
ξw
.
Note that in a first-order approximation, (A.53) can be written as simply
piw,t = ξw[(φν + σ
−1)Yˆt − wˆR,t − φνat − σ−1gt − νht] + βEtpiw,t+1. (A.54)
We can also write (A.52) as
Vw,t0 = Et0
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0ξw(c′w,xxt +
1
2
x′tCw,xxxt − x′tCw,xξξt +
1
2
cw,piwpi
2
w,t +
1
2
cw,pippi
2
p,t)
+t.i.p.+O(||ξ||3). (A.55)
We can add (A.51) and (A.55) to obtain
Vt0 = Et0
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0(Yˆt+
1
2
cyyYˆ
2
t −Yˆtcyξξt+
1
2
cpiwpi
2
w,t+
1
2
cpippi
2
p,t)+t.i.p.+O(||ξ||3)
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which is equation (2.34) in the text, where now
cyy ≡ 2 + ω − σ−1 + σ−1(1− s−1C )(ω + σ−1)−1
cyξξ ≡ (ω+σ−1)−1[−σ−1s−1C Gˆt+(1−σ−1)σ−1gt+ω(1+ω)qt−ωτ (1−σ−1)τˆt]
cpiw ≡
θw(1 + ν)
ξw(ω + σ−1)
cpip ≡
θp(1 + ω)
ξp(ω + σ−1)
and
Vt ≡ Vw,t
ξw(ω + σ−1)
+
Vp,t
ξp(ω + σ−1)
A.4 Derivation of equation (2.37)
We can multiply equation (2.36) by ΦY¯ u¯c and subtract from (2.30) to obtain
Ut0 = −Y¯ u¯cEt0
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0
{
1
2
qyYˆ
2
t − Yˆt(uyξξt + Φcyξξt) +
1
2
qppi
2
p,t +
1
2
qwpi
2
w,t
}
+
+Tt0 + t.i.p. +O(||ξ||3),
where
qp ≡ upip + Φcpip
=
θp(1− Φ)
ξp
+ Φ
θp(1 + ω)
ξp(ω + σ−1)
=
θp
ξp(ω + σ−1)
[(ω + σ−1) + Φ(1− σ−1)],
qw ≡ upiw + Φcpiw
=
θw(1− Φ)
φξw
+ Φ
θw(1 + ν)
ξw(ω + σ−1)
=
θw
ξwφ(ω + σ−1)
[(ω + σ−1) + Φ(1− σ−1)],
qy ≡ uyy + Φcyy
= (ω + σ−1)− Φ(1 + ω) + Φ(2 + ω − σ−1) + Φσ−1(1− s−1C )(ω + σ−1)−1
= (ω + σ−1) + Φ(1− σ−1) + Φσ
−1(1− s−1C )
ω + σ−1
.
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This can be rewritten in the form (2.37) given in the text, where
Yˆ ∗t ≡ q−1y [uyξξt + Φcyξξt]
= q−1y {σ−1gt + (1− Φ)ωqt + (ω + σ−1)−1Φ[−σ−1s−1C Gˆt + σ−1(1− σ−1)gt + ω(1 + ω)qt
−ωτ (1− σ−1)τˆt]}
= ω1Yˆ
n
t − ω2Gˆt + ω3τˆt,
and Ω, Yˆ nt , and the ωi are defined as in the text.
A.5 Determinacy conditions
Consider the first-order conditions
qyxt = κpϕp,t + κwϕw,t, (A.56)
qppip,t = −(ϕp,t − ϕp,t−1)− ϕr,t, (A.57)
qwpiw,t = −(ϕw,t − ϕw,t−1) + ϕr,t, (A.58)
ξpϕp,t − ξwϕw,t − ϕr,t + βEtϕr,t+1 = 0, (A.59)
and the structural equations
pip,t = κpxt + ξp(ωˆR,t − ωˆnt ) + up,t + βEtpip,t+1, (A.60)
piw,t = κwxt − ξw(ωˆR,t − ωˆnt ) + uw,t + βEtpiw,t+1, (A.61)
ωˆR,t = ωˆR,t−1 + piw,t − pip,t. (A.62)
We can substitute equations (A.56), (A.57), (A.58), (A.59) and (A.62) into
(A.60) to obtain
βqwqyEtϕp,t+1 = [qwqy(1 + β) + qpqwκ
2
p + 2qwqyξp]ϕp,t +
−[qwqy + qwqyξp]ϕp,t−1 + qpqyξpϕw,t−1 +
+[qwqpκwκp − ξwqyqw − ξpqyqp]ϕw,t − qpqwqyξpωˆnt +
+qpqwqyup,t + qyξpqpqwωˆR,t−1 + qyξp(qp + qw)ϕr,t(A.63)
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We can substitute equations (A.56), (A.57), (A.58), (A.59) and (A.62) into
(A.61) to obtain
βqpqyEtϕw,t+1 = [qpqy(1 + β) + qpqwκ
2
w + 2qpqyξw]ϕw,t +
−[qpqy + qpqyξw]ϕw,t−1 + qwqyξwϕp,t−1 +
+[qpqwκwκp − ξpqyqp − ξwqyqw]ϕp,t + qpqwqyξwωˆnt
+qpqwqyuw,t − qyξwqpqwωˆR,t−1 + qyξw(qp + qw)ϕr,t,(A.64)
Substitution of (A.57) and (A.58) yields
qwqpωˆR,t = qwqpωˆR,t−1 + qw(ϕp,t − ϕp,t−1)− qp(ϕw,t − ϕw,t−1)
+(qp + qw)ϕr,t (A.65)
finally (A.59) implies
βEtϕr,t+1 = ϕr,t + ξwϕw,t − ξpϕp,t, (A.66)
We can write the set of the above conditions (A.64), (A.63), (A.65), (A.66)
in the following system
AEtzt+1 = Bzt + Cυt (A.67)
where
z′t ≡ [ϕp,t ϕw,t ϕr,t ωˆR,t−1 ϕp,t−1 ϕw,t−1],
and
υ′t ≡ [ωˆnt up,t uw,t],
and
A ≡

βqwqy 0 0 0 0 0
0 βqpqy 0 0 0 0
0 0 β 0 0 0
0 0 0 qwqp 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 1

,
B ≡

b11 b12 b13 b14 b15 b16
b21 b22 b23 b24 b25 b26
−ξp ξw 1 0 0 0
qw −qp (qp + qw) qwqp −qw qp
1 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0

,
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b11 ≡ [qwqy(1 + β) + qpqwκ2p + 2qwqyξp],
b12 ≡ [qwqpκwκp − ξwqyqw − ξpqyqp],
b13 ≡ qyξp(qp + qw),
b14 ≡ qyξpqpqw,
b15 ≡ −[qwqy + qwqyξp],
b16 ≡ qpqyξp,
b21 ≡ [qpqwκwκp − ξpqyqp − ξwqyqw],
b22 ≡ [qpqy(1 + β) + qpqwκ2w + 2qpqyξw],
b23 ≡ qyξw(qp + qw),
b24 ≡ −qyξwqpqw,
b25 ≡ qwqyξw,
b26 ≡ −[qpqy + qpqyξw],
C ≡

−qpqwqyξp qpqwqy 0
qpqwqyξw 0 qpqwqy
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0

.
The determinacy of the equilibrium depends on the roots of the characteristic
equation associated with the system (A.67)
det(B − µA) = 0.
Rational-expectations equilibrium is determinate if the number of roots µi
such that |µi| < 1 is exactly equal to the number of predetermined variables
which in our case is three. Under this condition, we can solve the above
system in the following way. Consider as V the matrix of the left eigenvector
associated with the roots of the characteristic polynomial which are above
the unit circle. The matrix V has the property that V B = ΦV A, where
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Φ is a diagonal matrix that contains the roots µi such that |µi| > 1. By
premultiplying (A.67) by V we obtain
Etkt+1 = Φkt + V Cυt (A.68)
where we have defined kt ≡ V Azt. A unique and stable solution for {zt} can
be obtained by
zt = −Et
∞∑
j=0
Φ−(j+1)V Cυt+j.
We can partition V A as V A = [(V A)1 (V A)2] according to the non-predetermined
and predetermined endogenous variables in zt = [z1,t z2,t−1] and we can obtain
(V A)1z1,t + (V A)2z2,t = −Et
∞∑
j=0
Φ−(j+1)Cυt+j,
which can be solved (under conditions of invertibility on V A1) as
z1,t = −(V A)−11 (V A)2z2,t−1 − (V A)−11 Et
∞∑
j=0
Φ−(j+1)V Cυt+j (A.69)
We note that we can partition the system (A.67) in the following way[
A1 0
0 A4
]
Et
(
z1,t+1
z2,t
)
=
[
B1 B2
B3 B4
](
z1,t
z2,t−1
)
+
[
C1
C2
]
υt
We can then substitute (A.69) into the lower block of the above system to
obtain
z2,t = A
−1
4 (B4−B3(V A)−11 (V A)2)z2,t−1+A−14 C2υt−A−14 B3(V A)−11 Et
∞∑
j=0
Φ−(j+1)V Cυt+j
(A.70)
Using (A.69) and (A.70) and (A.56), (A.57), (A.58) and (A.62) we can obtain
the optimal path for {xt, pip,t, piw,t, ωˆR,t}.
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